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ESSAYS
Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders
ANTHONY

V. ALFIERI*
INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, I have searched the ethics of the lawyering process
for the place of identity, narrative, and community, initially looking to poverty

law practice' and more recently turning to criminal law representation. 2 From
the outset, race figured prominently in this search. During the last five years, the

figurations of race have grown to occupy a central part of what is now an
ongoing study of lawyers and ethics in cases of racially motivated violence. 3

The purpose of this continuing project is to understand the nature and meaning
of racial identity, the sound and substance of racialized narrative, and the form

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Miami School
of Law. Earlier versions of this Essay were presented in workshops at Cornell Law School, University
of Florida College of Law, Wayne State University Law School, and the 2001 Conference of the
Working Group on Law, Culture, and Humanities at the University of Texas at Austin College of
Liberal Arts. I am grateful to David Abraham, Kathy Abrams, Adrian Barker, Sarah Buel, Naomi Cahn,
Nancy Cook, Wes Daniels, Richard Delgado, John Ely, Martha Fineman, Michael Fischl, Clark
Freshman, Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Eden Harrington, Berta Hemandez-Truyol, Amelia Hope,
Lisa Iglesias, Sharon Keller, Pedro Malavet, David Moss, Kenneth Nunn, Larry Palmer, Juan Perea,
Sharon Rush, Steven Shiffrin, Jonathan Simon, Christopher Slobogin, Abbe Smith, Avi Soifer, Susan
Stefan, and Frank Valdes for their comments and support.
I also wish to thank Heather Cohen, Porpoise Evans, Christina Farley, Clare Membiela, Shana
Stephens, Kira Willig, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research
assistance, as well as Dan Gilman, Shannon McNulty, and the editorial staff of The Georgetown Law
Journal.This Essay is dedicated to Robert Alfieri, a Christmas uncle.
1.These prior works strived to expose and to controvert the underpinnings of poverty law practice.
See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (analyzing the disempowering interpretive practices of poverty
lawyers); Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (book review)
(examining the strains of representation in client-community advocacy).
2. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) [hereinafter Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence]; Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51
STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized
Defenses, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) [hereinafter Alfieri, Lynching Ethics]; Anthony V. Alfieri,
Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999) [hereinafter Alfieri, Prosecuting Race]; Anthony V.
Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000) [hereinafter
Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1293 (1998)
[hereinafter Alfieri, Race Trials]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800
(1996).
3. The project has sparked considerable scholarly controversy. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial
Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788,
791-99 (1996); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the
SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1571, 1572-83
(1999); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77
TEx. L. REV. 1585, 1587-1600 (1999).
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and ethical content of race-neutral representation for both prosecutors and
defense lawyers in the criminal justice system.
To that end, the project has focused, perhaps errantly, on high-profile criminal
race cases drawn from contemporary American legal history. Constructed from
transcripts, court records, and media reports, these trials of racial violence
bristle with the rhetoric of race. The discourse and imagery infusing the
prosecution and defense of racial violence revive the controversy over our
vision of the good lawyer in race trials. At stake in this controversy are the
status of racial dignity and community in American law and the norms of moral
nonaccountability and race-neutrality in legal advocacy and ethics. Instead of
the promise of resolution, the project proposes the modest accommodation of
reconciling racial dignitary and community interests with the duties of effective
representation in criminal prosecution and defense by curbing the use of
racialized narratives in race trials.
This mid-course Essay seeks to advance the purposes of both jurisprudential
and practical reconciliation through an investigation of race-conscious, community-regarding methods of representation culled from conventional and alternative models of criminal prosecution and defense. The Essay is divided into six
parts. Part I examines the current posture of prosecutors and defenders in race
cases. Part II analyzes the prosecution of racial violence. Part III sets forth a
race-conscious community ethic of prosecution. Part IV evaluates the defense of
racial violence. Part V puts forward a race-conscious defense ethic of representation. Part VI assesses new advocacy models for the integration of identity,
community, and race, and assays critiques of that proffered integration. The
Essay concludes with a meditation on harnessing advocacy and race in legal
theory and practice.

I.

PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS

Like prior endeavors aimed at the profession, this Essay attempts to uproot
the normative and empirical premises underlying the settled traditions of legal
representation and ethical responsibility. Uprooting the theoretical and practical
foundation of legal advocacy tests the logic and value of lawyering traditions
dominant in the fields of private and public law.4 The field of criminal justice
develops out of the practice traditions of prosecutors and defense lawyers.
Dense with penal statutes, punitive norms, and disciplinary institutions, and
crosscut by the adversary system, the field provides the context for the prosecution and defense functions. Neither function receives full exposition in isolated
acts of advocacy. Only the accumulation and intertwining of such acts amid the

4. Logic in legal practice is constituted by both coherence and efficacy. Coherence is a property of
the internal structure of lawyer practices, such as interviewing and counseling. Efficacy relates to the
external impact of lawyer practices on clients and communities, for example in the delivery of legal
services. Value pertains to the normative substance of community practices. Norms reverberate in the
character of identity and the content of narrative.
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adversarial tension of everyday representation give whole expression to the
meaning of prosecutorial and defense conduct. That meaning is enmeshed in
culture and society.
The actions of prosecutors and defense lawyers reflect and refashion cultural
artifacts (caste and color) and social norms (character and community). Acting
as sociolegal agents, prosecutors and defenders infuse legal discourse with
images and tropes gleaned outside the law, inscribing cultural and social
meaning into law. At the same time, they apply a juridical gloss to such images
and tropes, restyling popular meaning by force of law. Through this semiotic
and iterative process, prosecutors and defense lawyers acquire the role of
double signifier. Not only do they translate social meaning into law, but they
also construct social meaning out of law. Whether inside the courtroom or
outside the courthouse, prosecutors and defense lawyers are interpretive agents
engaged in sociolegal construction.
The scope of lawyer interpretive engagement in the criminal justice system is
far reaching. The boundaries of that engagement are laid down by constitutional
text, statutory provision, and common-law doctrine. Within those boundaries,
lawyers exercise substantial discretion. For prosecutors, discretion is ubiquitous
and profound, for example, in charging and plea-bargaining. For defense lawyers,
less pronounced discretion survives, flourishing in pretrial tactics (suppression
and venue motions) and trial strategies (jury selection and cross-examination).
For both interpretive agents, the discretion captured in narrative and storytelling
serves to mold the individual identity of defendants and victims, as well as the
collective identity of their families and communities.
Recognition that the discretion of prosecutors and defenders exerts an impact
beyond the courtroom challenges the practice traditions that historically insulate
the prosecution and defense function from interpretive, and consequently, moral
accountability. Prosecution traditions claim a narrow realm of interpretive
discretion familiar to the jurisprudence of legal formalism, confining interpretation to the discovery of fact and the application of law. Defense traditions, by
comparison, claim a broader domain of interpretive discretion resembling the
freewheeling policy and sociological machinations of legal realism. Under this
more modem framework, interpretation employs public policy and social science to reassess fact and revise law.
Two jurisprudential developments in liberal theory challenge these longstanding practice traditions. The first comes out of the law and narrative
movement in the form of discourse ethics.5 The second originates in the civil
rights and critical race movements in the figure of race ethics.6 Discourse ethics
5. The law and narrative movement enlivens clinical and nonclinical scholarship. See generally
THOMAS Ross, JUST STORIES: How THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAs (1996); LAW STORIES (Gary
Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
6. Critical race movements include Critical Race Theory, LatCrit Theory, Native American, and
Asian American theory. See generallyCRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrrING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed.,
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demands the moral accountability of legal actors when the voice or figure of the

"other" (defendant, victim, or community) is portrayed in narrative and story.

The actors include lawyers and judges. Their performative narratives and stories
encompass trial arguments, appellate briefs, and judicial opinions. Derived from
the liberal mandate to enlist and respect the "other" in dialogue, discourse ethics
asserts that legal translation and reinscription carry truth-telling responsibility.
7
That responsibility is partially encoded in procedural and regulatory rules. It
extends to adversaries, courts, clients, and third persons.
Race ethics enlarges the discursive responsibility encased in procedural and
regulatory rules to take account of reconciliation and reparation norms. Deduced from the American experience of racial violence, the ethics system
contends that dignitary and equality norms impose a heightened responsibility
in advocacy to honor the racial identity of the defendant and victim and,
moreover, to promote interracial community participation through education
and outreach. This responsibility is likewise partly entrenched in procedural and
regulatory rules. 8 It also runs to adversaries, courts, clients, and third persons.
Burdening the prosecution and defense functions with normative, indeed
transformative, responsibilities challenges the traditional place of legal advocacy in the criminal justice system. Allied with that system, the prosecutor
customarily stands as public sentinel, and the defense lawyer as constitutional
guardian. Assignment of the additional onus of textual accountability for word
and image compels changes in prosecution and defense habits of interpretation
and advocacy. Here, as elsewhere, race-conscious change provokes controversy
and often condemnation. 9 The cry of heresy leaps quickly when the intrinsic
commitments and the instrumental rationales of advocacy fall under attack. Yet,
out of that same provocation sometimes comes reform.
The instant project sounds a call for reform in the hope of racial progress.
Progress is judged not by the measure of prosecutorial conviction or defense
acquittal rates but by the normative standards of racial dignity and interracial
community. To be sure, these standards are undeveloped and sharply contested.
In fact, their very vagueness invites quarrel. The quarrel is cast in deontological
terms. It concerns the nature of a lawyer's duty in race trials.
2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F.
Perea et al. eds., 2000); see also CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997)
(discussing the critical race movement and feminism).
7. Both ethics and procedural rules codify the muted forms of lawyer truth-telling responsibility. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (requiring reasonable inquiry and evidentiary support behind factual allegations);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2000) (requiring meritorious claims and contentions based on
nonfrivolous good faith argument).
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2000); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (regulating civil peremptory challenges); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (regulating criminal peremptory challenges).
9. See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta" Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric
Academics, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 315-40 (2000); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law in the Canon
of Legal Academia, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1992-2010 (2000).
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Unlike more conventional treatments of the prosecution and defense functions in the criminal justice literature, prior works in this project addressed the
duty of race-trial representation in terms of racial identity, racialized narrative,
and color-conscious advocacy. That multifaceted inquiry is absent from the
surprisingly sparse literature discussing the roles of prosecutors and defenders
in local communities.'o Sketched impressionistically rather than empirically, the
instant inquiry discloses lawyer tendencies to construct racial identity, deploy
racialized narrative, and configure race-coded modes of representation deeply
entrenched in criminal advocacy.
Lawyers operating inside the criminal justice system construct racial identity
in the routine acts of daily advocacy. Prosecutors, for example, compile investigative targets, rank jury profiles, estimate flight risks in calibrating bail, formulate sentencing recommendations, and pronounce judgments of wrongdoing in
indictments, trial statements, and appellate arguments. Granted, these acts
establish neither a clear racial imprint nor a deliberate racial intent. But taken
together and accrued over time, they evoke images of color and character that
bear the mark of race and the inference of racial consciousness. For example,
between 1991 and 1997, racialized legal tactics pervaded the successive New
York state criminal and federal civil rights prosecutions of Lemrick Nelson and
Charles Price for the 1991 killing of Yankel Rosenbaum and the incitement of
four days of interracial violence in Crown Heights, Brooklyn." Additional
tactics and imagery permeated the federal criminal civil rights prosecution of
five white New York City police officers on charges of assaulting Abner Louima
at a Brooklyn station house in 1997.12 They also saturated the 1990-91 Central
Park Jogger sexual assault trials in New York City and the 1998-99 James Byrd
murder trials in Texas. 13
Criminal defense lawyers similarly exploit the imagery and rhetoric of race in
advocacy. Race informs their arguments and objections, direct and crossexaminations, and proposed jury instructions. The symbolic and rhetorical
presence of race is magnified in cases of racially motivated violence, both
black-on-white and white-on-black. The defense of Damian Williams and Henry
Watson on charges of beating Reginald Denny and others during the 1992 South
Central Los Angeles riots, for example, demonstrated that black criminal de-

10. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public
Defender, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHics 199, 211-20 (1999); Harold R. Washington & Geraldine S.
Hines, "Call My Lawyer": Styling a Community Based Defender Program, 8 BLACK L.J. 186, 188-92
(1983); David E. Rovella, The Best Defense ... : Rebuilding Clients'Lives to Keep Them from Coming
Back, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at Al; Sam Skolnik, Taking It to the Streets: DOJ Puts Big Bucks
Behind Community Prosecution, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at 1.
11. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1323-39.
12. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, supra note 2, at 1164-85 (discussing the feasibility and legitimacy
of a race-conscious model of federal prosecution).
13. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence, supra note 2, at 818-31 (exploring the nature of prosecutorial
norms and narratives, their cultural and social significance, and their impact on interracial community
in the aftermath of racial violence).
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fense stories present historically pernicious as well as transformative visions of
racial identity and racialized narrative.' 4 Likewise, the criminal and civil trials
of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald showed
that white criminal defense stories embody identity claims and narrative construc'5
tions that mimic and thereby reinforce racial caste structures of inequality.
The interconnection of race, law, and legal representation is unsurprising in a
nation founded on de jure and de facto racism. ' 6 The historical presence of race
7
and racism in American law gives rise to claims of color and character' that

shape reputation 8 and endow privilege '9 through image, interpretation, and
narrative. 20 The upshot is a racial identity molded by legal agents 2 ' and
litigation, 2 and further, declared as truth.2 3 Whatever the alchemy of advocacy
and adjudication, identity remains unstable, disrupted by class,24 gender,25

14. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1301-20 (proposing a race-conscious
ethic of professional responsibility appropriate to the defense function in race cases).
15. See Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 2, at 1063-65 (investigating subordinating racialized
defense strategies in criminal and civil trials of white-on-black violence).
16. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness, History, and the Law, in THE HOUSE THAT
RACE BUILT 280, 280-88 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1997); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of
Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 24-96
(1998).
17. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A DarkerShade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1705, 1713-34
(2000); Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1375, 1382-1410 (1999); Alain
de Benoist, What is Racism?, 114 TELOs 11, 13-31 (1999).
18. See Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L.
REv. 569, 575-86 (1999); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1138-47 (2000).
19. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637,
1659-65 (1999); John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to InterrogateRacialPrivilege, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 421-27 (2000).
20. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 256-319 (1972); DARYL
MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY 1-136 (1997); Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue

in the Reconstruction Congresses, 34 LAW & Soc'v REV. 315, 322-52 (2000); Michael A. Elliot, Telling
the Difference: Nineteenth-CenturyLegal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 611,
611-24 (1999).
21. See William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, Challenging RacialProfiles: Attacking Jim Crow on
the Interstate, 23 CHAMPION 14, 15-18 (1999).
22. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the NineteenthCentury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 123-76 (1998); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1806-25 (2000); David M.
Siegel, Felix Frankfurter Charles Hamilton Houston and the "N-Word": A Case Study in the Evolution
of Judicial Attitudes Toward Race, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 317, 331-45, 354-70 (1998); John
Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in
America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 818-46 (2000).
23. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Race and Reason: The Assault on Critical Race Theory and the Truth
About Inequality, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3-24 (1998); Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth and CriticalRace
Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 525, 532-40 (1999) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH INAMERICAN LAW (1997)).

24. See Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste... ? Rethinking
Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1302-07 (1999).
25. See Joan Williams, Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into Race and Class
Conflict, 15 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 61-77 (1999).
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sexuality, 26 and the multiple racial categories 27 of culture and society. Despite
its unsteady quality, racial identity subjects individuals and whole communities
to suspicion,28 notwithstanding state affirmative intervention,29 speech regulation,30 and hate crime legislation. 3' Combating suspicion in the spirit of diversity, 32 multiracial coalition, 3 3 and good will 34 falters against the force of criminal
law advocacy.
The traditional function and structure of criminal law persist 35 in spite of

26. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity,Critical
Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9-113 (1999).
27. See ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 45-106
(1999); Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing":Enforcing the Chinese
Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 20-31 (2000); Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin,
Emerging from the Margins of Historical Consciousness: Chinese Immigrants and the History of
American Law, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 325, 335-50 (1999); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian
Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV.
347, 352-62 (1997); Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black? The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda
and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2387-2404
(1999); George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20
CHICANO-LAT1NO L. REV. 1, 4-13 (1999); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship,
"Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 281-315 (1997). See
generally IMMIGRANTS OUT! (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
28. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and
DoctrinalRemedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1416-25 (2000); Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
EvaluatingReasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 101-24 (1999); Eric Silver, Race, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and Violence Among Persons with Mental Disorders: The Importance of
Contextual Measurement, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 449, 452-55 (2000); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962-98
(1999).
29. See Rachel F. Moran, Unrepresented, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 251,
251-70 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998); Michael Omi & Dana Y. Takagi, Situating Asian
Americans in the PoliticalDiscourse on Affirmative Action, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, supra, at 271, 271-80; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:Intergroup Relations

After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1258-76 (1998).
30. See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 156-90
(1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution,and City Regulation of Speech, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 209, 211-17 (1998).

31. See Charles H. Jones, Hate Crimes and Negro Freedom, I RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 357, 358-78
(1999).
32. See George Sher, Diversity, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 104 (1999) (finding "a desire to rationalize
the use of preferential treatment to benefit members of previously wronged groups" in the justification
of diversity).
33. Compare Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 302-05, 306 (2000) (arguing that "dichotomous thought impairs groups' ability to
forge useful coalitions"), with Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social
Science Theories Identify Discriminationand Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 315, 426-40, 441 (2000) (citing "the exclusive fixation with atomized discrimination"
as a barrier to broad coalitions).
34. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L.
REv. 1, 12-39 (1999).
35. See Douglas Husak, The Function and Structure of the Substantive CriminalLaw, 18 L. & PHIL.
85, 90-93 (1999) (reviewing PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997)).
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39
8
36
inequality,3 7 crime, 3 and federal intercession.
quarrels over procedure,

Criminal law organizes and legitimates state authority to enforce debts of
wrongdoing through violence.4 0 In the post hoc reconstructions of the courtroom, state violence and legal authority are social facts of coercion and punishment.4 1
Reexamination of the advocacy roles of prosecutors and defenders in the
criminal justice system requires an analysis of punishment as an instrument of
violence.4 2 Intimately tied to punishment, violence is basic to American politics,
culture, and society.4 3 Both punishment and violence harbor competing values:
48
justice, 44 liberty,4 5 atonement,46 rehabilitation. 7 When linked to deterrence,
4 9 commensurate with commonsense 0 and public
punishment demands blame,
5
morality. '

36. See Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principlesand Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 533, 556-66 (1999) (reviewing AKIIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTrTUTON AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(1997)).

37. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 169-80 (1999).
38. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 99-129

(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996).
39. See James A. Strazzella, The Federalizationof Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE
REP. 5, 5-24.
40. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1618-28 (1986).
41. See Michael Baurmann, Legal Authority as a Social Fact, 19 L. & PHIL. 247, 252-58 (2000);
Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 41-60 (2000).
42. See RICHARD A. SPURGEON HALL ET AL., THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305-31

(2000). Whether legal violence offers the best means of combating societal violence remains an open
question. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE
AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the
Violence?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 853-65 (2000).

43. See William Lyons, Violence and the Politics of Law and Order, 34 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 213,
214-34 (2000) (reviewing KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997), and FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997)).

44. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Desserts: Criminal Law,
Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 641-59 (2000).
45. See generally Patrick Fitzsimons, Michel Foucault: Regimes of Punishment and the Question of
Liberty, 27 INT'L J. SOC. L. 379 (1999).
46. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishmentas Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1804-46 (1999); see
also Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1359-99 (2000)
(discussing the strategic role of mercy in criminal justice decisionmaking).
47. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1218-45 (1998); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841-51 (2000).
48. See Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943,
956-87 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413, 425-35
(1999); see also Phillip Montague, Justifying Preventive Detention, 18 L. & PHIL. 173, 177-80, 184
(1999) (parsing justifications of preventative detention as punishment for reckless endangerment).
49. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 610-36 (1997).

50. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
669, 673-98 (2000).
51. See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views
About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive
Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 717-38 (2000).
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In accounting for the victims and agents of private and public violence,5 2 the
norms of criminal responsibility 53 and punishment 54 usually overlook differences in culture and community.5 5 Merely acknowledging the interrelation
among difference, crime, and community, 56 however, fails to eradicate bias in the
criminal justice system, 57 in advocacy, adjudication, or policing.58 Racial contamination of the criminal law in the sway of bias and discrimination is well documented. 59

52. See Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 336-47; Ahmed A. White, Victims'
Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence,87 Ky. L.J. 357, 373-412 (1999); Kirk J.
Nahra, The Role of Victims in Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 1999,
at 30-32; see also Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517, 518-38 (2000) (discussing the victims' rights movement and the role of
witnesses' opinions in capital sentencing decisions).
53. See Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the
Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 393, 402-11
(1999); Martin J. Wiener, Judges v. Jurors: Courtroom Tensions in Murder Trials and the Law of
Criminal Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century England, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 467, 476-504 (1999);
see also Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn": Implicationsfor Research Design
and Methods of Proofin Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179,
186-206 (2000) (offering critique of the conceptual, political, and policy implications of normfocused scholarship); Roundtable Discussion, The New Chicago School: Myth or Reality?, 5 U.
CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2-4, 7-11 (1998) (explicating interdisciplinary use of social norms to
understand criminal law and behavior).
54. See Herbert Morris, Some Further Reflections on Guilt and Punishment, 18 L. & PHIL. 363,
373-78 (1999); see also Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and
Representation in Dead Man Walking and Last Dance, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 153, 154-66 (1999)
(examining the cultural semiotics of capital punishment).

55. See James J. Sing, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in
the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845, 1849-66 (1999); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culturefor Bad Behavior,
12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 104-16 (2000); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing:Residents'Perceptions
in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 129, 135-52 (2000).
56. See IAN BROWNLEE, COMMUNITY PUNISHMENT: A CRICAL INTRODUCTION 5-61 (1998); John J. Am-

mann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization, Community Courts and
Community Compassion, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 811, 813-19 (2000); Mike Brogden & Sharon Harkin,
Community Rules Preventing Re-Offending by Child Sex Abusers-A Life History Approach, 28 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 45, 46-47 (2000); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CmL-KENT L. REV. 669, 677-94
(1998).
57. See Andrew D. Leipold, Objectives Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory
Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 564-82 (1998); Trish Oberweis & Michael
Musheno, Policing Identities: Cop Decision Making and the Constitution of Citizens, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 897, 914-17 (1999); Sarah G. Vincent, The Hate Within Ourselves: Criminal Law's Attempt to
Overcome Bias, 16 HAgv. BLAcKLETrER L.J. 229, 232-41 (2000) (reviewing FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE,
PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999)).
58. See ROBERT P. WEISS, SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT 403-560 (1999);

Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-MaintenancePolicing New York Style, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 377-86 (1998); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 290-312; see also Willem de Lint, A Post-modem Turn in Policing:
Policing as Pastiche, 27 INT'L J. Soc. L. 127, 144-46 (1999) (linking the traditional institutional bases
of police authority to the moral order of the nation-state).
59. See JAMES A. CHAMBERS, BLACKS AND CRIME: A FUNCTION OF CLASS 199-218 (1995); KATHERYN K.

RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 1-46, 110-48 (1998); Angela Y. Davis, Race and Criminalization:Black
Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT, supra note 16, at 264,
264-79; Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie, Race, Ethnicity and the Spatial Dynamic: Toward a Realistic Study
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61
posits a corrective.
Neither hate crime legislation 60 nor affirmative action
jury6 2 or to
the
nullifying
of
judgment
deliberative
Furthermore, resort to the
alternative jurisprudential movements 6 3 provides little recompense. The quandary of race contamination vexes the prosecution of racial violence.

II.

PROSECUTING RACIAL VIOLENCE

First-blush analysis of the prosecution of racial violence suggests an upsurge
in high-profile criminal and civil rights trials at federal and state levels. The
significance of this first impression is augmented by a mounting literature on the
65
prosecution function, 64 criminal justice norms, and federal-state regulatory
of Black Crime, Crime Victimization and CriminalJustice Processingof Blacks, in READING RACISM AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 127, 127-43 (David Baker ed., 1994); Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying
Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision Makers, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 1-22 (Lloyd E.
Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993); Carolyn Wolpert, Note, Considering Race and Crime:
DistillingNon-PartisanPolicy from Opposing Theories, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 265, 268-80 (1999).
60. See JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICS
29-44, 79-110 (1998); LAWRENCE, supra note 57, at 80-160; JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITr, HATE
CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 179-203 (1993); James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A.

Potter, Hate Crimes: A CriticalPerspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2-50 (1997); Frederick M. Lawrence,
The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 144, 150-57, 161-68 (1999-2000); see
also Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 511-38 (1999)
(centering the victim in the normative foundation of bias crime legislation).
61. See Man J. Matsuda, Crime and Affirmative Action, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 309, 312-23
(1998)
62. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury
Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285, 301-14 (1999); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the
Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 877, 881-903 (1999); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes
in Jury Deliberations,113 HARV. L. REv. 1261, 1276-96 (2000) (examining the participation of people
of color in criminal jury trials).
63. See Mary L. Bellhouse, Crimes and Pardons: Bourgeois Justice, Gendered Virtue, and the
Criminalized Other in Eighteenth-Century France, 24 SIGNS 959, 972-1004 (1999); Bryna Bogoch,
Judging in a 'Different Voice': Gender and the Sentencing of Violent Offences in Israel, 27 INT'L J. SoC.
L. 51, 52-54 (1999); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osbom, Reviving the Late Liberal State: On Capital
Punishment in an Age of Gender Confusion, 24 SIGNS 1119, 1122-29 (1999); G. Kristian Miccio, Notes
from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 154-71 (2000).
64. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Are ProsecutorialEthics Standards Different?, 68 FOROHAM L.
REV. 1453, 1458-68 (2000); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 930-62 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce
A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 224-45 (2000). See generally
Symposium, The Changing Role of the FederalProsecutor,26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999).
65. See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 2477, 2479-89 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategiesfor Private Norm
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1870-71 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 365-94 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social
Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610-22 (1998); Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1171-83 (1998);
Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and
Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRItM. L. REv. 137 (1997); Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 805,
809-30 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of
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authority. 66 The prosecutorial literature tends to focus on the scope of lawyer
discretion, 67 though the import of race 68 and narrative, 69 and the realms of hate
crime, 70 capital punishment, 7' and domestic violence 72 attract growing attention. Increasingly, the spotlight of attention shifts to the victim 73 and commu76
75
nity,74 rather than to prosecutorial misconduct or civil rights enforcement.
The prosecution of racial violence typically tramples the defendant and
victim, as well as their affiliated communities. In the status distinctions and
hierarchies of race trials, defendant, victim, and community become enshrouded
in racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-coded representation. On the
surface, the shroud is color-blind. In fact, the prosecution of race trials adheres
to a color-blind narrative of law and policy. Allegations of factual guilt and
innocence join this narrative. While its content may veer from the covert
Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 3, 22-29 (Joshua

Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
66. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?,65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355, 423-27 (1996); Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade
Amendment, 113 HARv. L. REV. 2080, 2083-93 (2000).
67. See Rory K. Little, Proportionalityas an Ethical Preceptfor Prosecutors in Their Investigative
Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 738-63 (1999); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of
Prosecutorsin DiscretionaryDecisions, 68 FORDHAm L. REV. 1511, 1515-30 (2000).
68. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecutionand Race: The Powerand Privilege of Discretion,67 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 13, 20-38 (1998); Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FOROHAM L. REV. 1473, 1492-1504 (2000).

69. See David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecution, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 75-96 (1999); see also Philip N.
Meyer, "Desperatefor Love III": Rethinking Closing Arguments as Stories, 50 S.C. L. REV. 715,
717-24 (1999) (comparing the narrative story structure of criminal defense lawyers).
70. See Martha Minow, Regulating Hatred: Whose Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose Power?, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1253, 1259-71 (2000); AnnJanette Rosga, Bias Before the Law: The Rearticulation of
Hate Crimes in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 29, 50-61 (1999); see also
Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishmentfor Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118, 121-25
(2000) (challenging the logic of criminal prosecution of state-sponsored mass atrocity).
71. See David J. Novak, Anatomy of a Federal Death Penalty Prosecution: A Primerfor Prosecutors, 50 S.C. L. REV. 645 (1999); Ronald J. Sievert, Capital Murder: A Prosecutor's Personal
Observationson the Prosecution of Capital Cases, 27 AM. J. CRN. L. 105, 109-11 (1999).
72. See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1999); Richard Devine, Targeting High Risk Domestic Violence Cases:
The Cook County, Chicago, Experience, PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 30.
73. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000); Rachel King, Why a Victims' Rights Constitutional
Amendment Is a Bad Idea: PracticalExperiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 357, 366-401
(2000).
74. See James C. Backstrom, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the
Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 50 S.C. L. REV. 699, 708-13 (1999); Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2000, at 31.
75. See BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4:9-13 (2d ed. 1999); JOSEPH F.
MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS (2d ed. 1999); Kenneth Rosenthal,
Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 945-61 (1998).
76. See generally ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKi, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING
LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL

CIVIL RIGHTS

(1997).
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color-coded insinuation of racial animus to the overt race-conscious assertion of
invidious stereotype, still the narrative appeals to neutrality. Narrative neutrality
differs from nonpartisanship. Within the adversarial system, prosecutors serve
as partisan representatives of the state, but strive to maintain the pretense of
race-neutrality. The formality of trial and appellate procedures, and the physical
impartiality of the courtroom, fortify this pretense.
Rationalizing racialized modes of civil and criminal advocacy as race-neutral
depends on naturalist and necessitarian justifications. These twin justifications
rely on three overlapping modes of reasoning: objectivity, form, and process.
The logic of objectivity fastens racialized narrative to empirical fact, suggesting
that a racialized narrative merely describes a naturally racialized world. Description in this sense is a simple, value-neutral activity undisturbed by the histories
of racial caste and conflict. As such, it is a dispassionate means of rendering the
world of race discoverable.
Prosecutors routinely apply the logic of objectivity in charging, pretrial
motions, and trial argument. In the case of Charles Price, for example, federal
prosecutors charged Price with incitement in fueling black community protest
and violence against Hasidic Jews in Crown Heights, Brooklyn.7 7 By definition,
the charge of incitement asserts both the individual power to control or manipulate others and a group receptivity to exhortation or impassioned plea. On these
terms, the charge implies the universal corruptibility and vulnerability of human
nature. That sense of universality appears color-blind, extending equally to
white and black. Applied to the conduct of a black man in the context of a
race-religious riot, however, the charge acquires a color-coded meaning that
signifies race and racial character. Historically situated, the charge against Price
demonizes the black insurgent, alluding to the antebellum culture of slave
suppression and revolt. It also caricatures the black mob, evoking the antebellum culture of primitive slaves in tribal frenzy. Inured to the racial tropes of
naturalist objectivity and convinced of their own conscious neutrality, federal
prosecutors regarded their cultural performance in charging and trying Price as
color-blind and impartial.
The logic of form links racialized narrative to overt bias and prejudice. This
linkage requires proof of discriminatory intent. Without proof of intent, there
can be no bias. Limiting racialized narrative to intentional discrimination cabins
the regulatory ambit of ethics rules to conscious bias and prejudice, leaving
unconscious forms of prosecutorial bias and prejudice safely beyond the reach
of bar supervision and court sanction.
Prosecutors likewise employ the logic of form in their charging, pretrial, and
trial practices. In the case of Lemrick Nelson, for instance, New York state
prosecutors charged Nelson with four counts of second-degree murder and
manslaughter.7 8 At trial, in their opening statement and closing argument, the

77. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1335.
78. See id. at 1329.
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prosecutors contended that Nelson "got caught up in the frenzy of the moment." 79 Nelson, they insisted, "was exactly the type of person who you would
expect to get caught up in the mindless mob violence." 80 At the time of his
arrest, Nelson was a sixteen-year-old black male with no prior arrest record. 8'
Like millions of young black juveniles in impoverished, segregated communities, he suffered the physical and mental privations of a childhood wrought by
82
deficient public education, inadequate health care, and family dysfunction.' 83
Yet, none of these circumstances clearly predisposed Nelson to racial "frenzy.
In fact, nothing in the evidentiary record rendered him "exactly the type of
person who you would expect to get caught up in the mindless mob violence. 8 4
State prosecutors, however, charged and treated Nelson as a blackfaced sociopath even though medical evidence of pathology and disorder appeared sparse
and vague.85 The conflation of race and deviance in the charging and trial
narratives of the Nelson state prosecutors occurred within a logic of form that
provided succor to bias and prejudice. Absent proof of conscious motive and
discriminatory intent, that logic offered ethical containment for unconscious
racial transgression in the prosecution of Nelson's case.
The logic of process attributes racialized narrative to instrumental forces outside the
law and the adversary system. On this premise, it is unruly external forces (politics,
economics, culture, and society) that intrude upon the impartiality of the law and the
legal process. Left to operate under the rule of liberal legalism, so the argument goes,
the internal structure of the law (its rules, agents, and institutions) would maintain a
race-free, or at least race-neutral, environment.
Prosecutors utilize the logic of process in charging and trial practice as well.
In the case of James Byrd, for example, Texas state prosecutors charged three
young white male defendants, two of them Klansmen, with capital murder
under the legal process dictates of equal treatment. 86 Adverting to the egalitarian symmetry of liberal legalism, the prosecutors interpreted Texas criminal law
to compel the charge of capital murder even in the setting of white-on-black
racial violence.8 7 Their admission that "no Klansman had ever been convicted
of harming a black man," 88 bolstered the egalitarian logic and constitutional
neutrality of the charging process in the Byrd trials.8 9 "Now they see," the

79. Id. at 1334.
80. Id.
81. See United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
82. See Nelson, 921 F. Supp. at 109-13 (discussing Nelson's education, environment, and family)
83. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1334.
84. Id.
85. See Nelson, 921 F. Supp. at 109-17 (reviewing Nelson's intellectual development, personality
disorder, and psychological maturity).
86. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence, supra note 2, at 820-21, 826.
87. See id. at 849.
88. Richard Stewart, Jasper Trial Site Undecided: Venue Arguments to Be Heard Today, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 8, 1999, at Al.

89. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence, supra note 2, at 841.
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prosecutors exclaimed in a paean to the rule of law, "that a white man can be
given a death sentence for killing a black man."9 °
The logics of objectivity, form, and process apply equally under naturalist
and necessitarian rationales. The naturalistic justification of racialized prosecution leans heavily on claims of objectivity and form. For the naturalist prosecutor, race and racial hierarchy constitute incontrovertible facts. On this view, the
race-ing of facts in pleadings, trial arguments, and appellate briefs is an
evidentiary compulsion, instead of an invention. At successive phases of trial
and sentencing in the Byrd case, for example, Texas state prosecutors referred to
as a "racist psychopath" 9 ' and to another as "satanic" in his
one Klan defendant
"racist views."' 92 For the naturalist prosecutor, these views are found inlayed in
the social reality of racial hierarchy.
The necessitarian justification for racialized prosecution rests more acutely on
adversarial process values. At race trials, those values combine with the logics
of objectivity and form to accomplish the goals of representation, even if the
end goals bend to racial stereotype. Trafficking in stereotypes reduces objectivity to an adversarial exchange of evidentiary proffer and objection. Out of this
exchange, already compromised by inconsistent rules of admission and the ad
hoc determinations of local triers of fact, comes an artificial sense of courtroom
objectivity. Immersed in this sensibility, prosecutors rebuff claims of external
objectivity, accepting the contingent nature of evidentiary rulings and fact
findings.
The tight embrace of internal objectivity misleads both prosecutors and
courts into a stance that devalues racially subordinate communities. In the
Central Park Jogger case, neither the prosecutors nor the courts realized that the
construction of the juvenile defendants in the guise of racial predators not only
denied, but also defaced the larger reality of the defendants' families, schools,
and communities located outside the courtroom. 93 Nor did they realize that the
disparagement and obliteration of that social reality would offend communities
of color throughout New York City, thereby causing an irreparable breach of
faith in the criminal justice system.9 4

Similarly, for the necessitarian prosecutor, form fulfills a crabbed function
specific to the adversary system. Prosecutorial forms of investigation, indictment, and trial strategy match racialized narratives to the substantive purposes
of prosecution: black-on-white and white-on-black. Conformity legitimates claims
of constitutional, statutory, and common-law wrongdoing. In the trials of Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price, for instance, prosecution claims of civil rights

90. Stewart, supra note 88.
91. Jury in Jasper Case Weighs Man's Fate, Jurors Weigh Fate of Byrd's Convicted Killer, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 23, 1999, at B6.

92. Court TV, Texas Dragging Death Murderer Sentenced to Death (Feb. 25, 1999), http://
www.courttv.com/trials/jasper/022599 am-ctv.html.
93. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence, supra note 2, at 818-19, 830.
94. Id.
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statutory violations accompany racialized narratives of individual pathology and
"vigilante mob" revenge to advance the retributive punishment of black-onwhite violence. 95 The exploitation of racialized norms and narratives in prosecution signals a loss of faith in objective judgment, neutral form, and fair process.
The justification of racial prosecution under naturalistic and necessitarian
rationales ensnares prosecutors in the widening debate over the place of race in
lawyering and ethics. 96 This debate strikes at the core of the prosecutorial duty
to embrace a color-blind constitutional faith despite state and public pressure to
deploy color-coded stereotypes in the interests of justice. The temptation to
breach the higher duty of color-blind constitutionalism in race trials for reasons
of individual or collective justice recommends recalibrating the moral baseline
of prosecution.
The trials of Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price on charges of unprovoked
murder and mob incitement illustrate the prosecutorial moral imagination distorted by racial identity and narrative.97 The narrative of Lemrick Nelson heard
from prosecutors speaks in natural and neutral tones about an out-of-wedlock,
ill-schooled, sixteen-year-old black juvenile deserving of adult trial and sentencing. This portrait, engulfing a generation or more of young black men, confirms
the symbolic caste of race and the narrative status of racial inferiority. In race
trials, the precept of inferiority taints prosecutorial speech and conduct, reducing the defendant to an object of hate. Here Nelson, presumptively guilty of the
sin of blackness, is pushed beyond the redemptive powers of law and society.
The Nelson and Price prosecutions reinstate a vision of blackness as original
sin. At trial, prosecutors depict Nelson and Price in the bonds of deviant
pathologies of race hatred and mob violence without hope of rehabilitation. This
totalizing version of irredeemable black racial inferiority causes individual and
community harm in the experience of stigma. The concept of stigma injury
derives from civil rights doctrine in affirmative action, school desegregation,
and voting rights. The injury of stigma ensues from state-enacted racial classification. Like harm flows from state-sanctioned racial regulation of the electoral
process as exemplified by gerrymandering. Predicated on color-blind principles
of participatory citizenship, the notion of expressive or representational harm
stems from the perception of institutionalized racial bias.
Theories of stigma injury and expressive or representational harm fashion a
new ethic of prosecution based on social contract and group defamation precepts. Animated by legal and political responsibility to the "other" (individual,
group, or community), the ethic binds racial groups in a reconfigured social
contract respectful of the dignity of racial identity and the integrity of racial
95. See Alfieri, Race Trials,supra note 2, at 1334-35.
96. See, e.g., Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill, ContemporaryCivil Rights Struggle: The Role of Black
Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185, 185-90 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race,
Recognition, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1509-69 (1998).
97. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1330-32. See generally United States v. Nelson, 921 F
Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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community. This reimagined ethic of prosecutorial responsibility leads to provocative conclusions about the importance of group and community representation
in race trials. These conclusions risk the amendment and sometimes the abandonment of the liberal norms governing representational autonomy and loyalty.
Uncovering alternative norms sufficient to mediate the tension between
individual and collective autonomy and obligation starts with reciprocity. By
reciprocity, I mean a shared sense of equitable exchange. The cultivation of this
sentiment and an openness to an exchange of pluralistic views are basic to
deliberative democracy. Here, the concept of reciprocity is grounded in the idea
of mutual state, victim, defendant, and community accountability. It is realized
in the practice of deliberative democracy. Local democratic practices afford no
guarantee of individual-collective or state-community interest mediation. By
force of training and culture, prosecutors elevate state interests over community,
defendant, and victim considerations. But reciprocity at least introduces the
dialogue of community restoration. Restorative dialogues of agreement must
anticipate the protest of individual and group divergence and conflict. Rooted in
the customs of radical individualism, pluralistic dissent, and adversarial competition, that protest may defeat the interest convergence needed to implement a
race-conscious, community-guided model of prosecution.
Consider this race-conscious model in the Abner Louima case. 98 During
August 1997 in New York, the Brooklyn district attorney indicted four arresting
officers on state charges of assault and sexual abuse. Subsequently, the U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Zachary W. Carter, commenced a
federal investigation, convening a federal grand jury to conduct a criminal
inquiry. In February 1998, Carter filed a superseding federal indictment charging five officers with criminal civil rights violations. Simultaneously, he referred
the Louima incident to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice for a city-wide police brutality investigation of the New York City Police
Department.
The Louima federal criminal prosecution and civil rights investigation present
a race-conscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion. The
prosecution and investigation demonstrate that a race-conscious approach to
prosecutorial decisionmaking may not only meet but invigorate the requirements of conventional ethics rules. In addition to rule compliance, the Louima
prosecution and investigation exhibit the state's normative reaffirmation of
racial dignity and equality. Together, dignitary and equality norms protect
individuals and communities of color against group- or state-sanctioned racial
violence.
Race-conscious, community-oriented duties to investigate and prosecute cases
of racially motivated violence correspond with the public purposes of criminal
justice: positive law sanction, moral retribution, and instrumental deterrence.
They also coincide with the prosecutorial tradition of heroic moral witness. The
98. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, supra note 2, at 1172-83.
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ideal of bearing historic witness to confront injustice impels advocacy in other
areas of the criminal law-for instance, in death penalty defense practice. In the
Louima case, the ideal urges a sympathetic view of federal prosecutors as
modem abolitionists in the struggle for American racial dignity and equality.
Too often prosecutors buttress racial hierarchy instead of equality.
The reinforcement of hierarchies of white dominance and black subordination
in the prosecution of racially motivated violence occurs in the symbolic and
rhetorical representation of the body-its color, its caste, and its racial character.
For the prosecutor, race-talk and racial imagery surround the public defense of
the victim and the interrogation of the defendant. The disjunction of the body
from personhood, from the corpus of the victim and the defendant, and from the
ethos of their respective families and communities alienates prosecutors and the
public. Alienation in criminal and civil rights prosecution prevents dignitary
redemption of the person and community reconciliation of segregated groups.
The tendency toward victim, defendant, and community estrangement in race
trials is embedded in the tradition of criminal prosecution. In the Louima case,
this practice was overcome by affirmative and sustained prosecutorial intervention. Observed throughout communities of color in New York, that intervention
instigated and gained momentum from political organization and mobilization
over claims of criminal and civil rights injustice. The speed and scope of that
mobilization points to the potential for broader community organization around
the norms of criminal and civil justice.
A.

PROSECUTORIAL NORMS

The move away from body-centered advocacy to higher traditions of representation marked by victim-, defendant-, and community-affirming prosecution
requires the backing of constitutional principles, citizenship ideals, professionalism values, abolitionist traditions, and moral aspirations. Affirming those values
in the prosecution of race trials signals a jurisgenerative process of normative
reform. 99 Under a positive law regime, these values may be established by

voluntary act, by office, or by rule. The office of the prosecutor, its rules, and
collective acts shape public perceptions of racial fairness, social good, and
community.
Constitutional norms generate race-conscious prosecutorial duties of community outreach in cases of racially motivated violence by reference to the
prosecutor's role as a constitutional officer. In the Louima prosecution, Zachary
Carter gained institutional strength from his constitutionally sanctioned position, ratified under rules of federal supremacy. Ratification gave Carter access to
constitutional and statutory sources of authority independent of his general
oversight of the federal criminal justice system within the Eastern District of
New York. Accompanying the charge of district-wide administration of justice
99. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 11-44 (1983).
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is the duty to implement and enforce a policy of nondiscrimination. Enforcement commands the equal treatment of all defendants, victims, and communities. This equitable mandate extends to investigative, charging, trial, and
sentencing decisions. At times, when the public and political clamor for retribution overwhelms the call for equality, as in the Louima and Byrd cases, the
breadth of the mandate collides with the duties to secure individual and community justice. Disparity in case-by-case prosecutorial assessments of victim and
community justice enhances the likelihood of collision and the consequent
rupture of prosecutorial connections to the defendant, his family, and community. The definitional vagueness of racial community intensifies that rupture.
Citizenship norms likewise stimulate race-conscious prosecutorial duties of
community outreach in race cases. In the Louima case, the malevolent impulse
of arresting and conspiring officers springs from racial bias. Federal prosecution
and investigation of that widespread impulse upholds the principle of equal
respect and shared citizenship for communities of color in the criminal justice
system.
Racial norms also stir race-conscious prosecutorial duties of community
outreach. Founded in law, history, and jurisprudence, the norms borrow antidiscrimination principles from civil rights doctrine. The same norms pull antisubordination teachings from the critical race movement. They take as well from the
fundamentalist commands of conservative black nationalism.
Moral norms additionally promote race-conscious prosecutorial duties of
outreach in cases of racially motivated violence. Infusion of extraprofessional
modes of virtue partially repairs the formalist separation of law and morality.
No longer confronted by a choice between intrinsic and extrinsic venues for
moral sustenance, prosecutors are free to grasp the law itself for moral guidance. Grasping the law in the context of criminal or civil rights enforcement
discloses a moral commitment to constitutional equality.
To build a race-conscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion from norms implanted in constitutional, citizenship, professionalism, racial,
and moral landscapes requires upheaval in the traditional function of federal and
state prosecution. Integrating revised considerations of racial identity, racialized
narrative, and interracial community into that function upsets the prosecutorial
decisionmaking process in its entirety, from charging to sentencing. Thus
revised, prosecutors must look to evidence of racial identity and racialized
narrative, and to the potential for community mobilization, at the very outset of
the charging decision. In the Louima case, racial identity swirls around color,
alienage, accent, and language. Racialized narratives assemble from slur and
innuendo. United in the violence of police brutality, racial identity and narrative
momentarily connect communities of color and their immigrant constituencies.
As shown in the Louima trial, the function of race-conscious prosecution is to
protect such vulnerable communities against police brutality and to mobilize
citizens in demanding their civic rights to racial dignity, equality, and justice.
In race trials, neither community protection nor mobilization will increase
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from the charging decision alone. Once made, the decision to charge must lead
prosecutors to allocate investigative and trial resources to awaken and uplift
community. Doing so involves pretrial outreach and publicity, and the tactical
use of narratives at trial and sentencing. The discourses of opening statements,
examinations, objections, experts, and closing arguments are all ripe for narrative revision.
Simply reconceiving the narrative purpose of race trials falls short of the
mark. Prevention of identity-based violence calls for police training and community outreach to establish monitoring, compliance, and enforcement structures
with the active participation of citizens of color. Collaboration with local
churches, community centers, hospitals, and schools provides opportunities for
citizen participation.
The collaboration attending community-based prosecution in race cases assumes the susceptibility of law and legal agents to racial reason. The dialogue
of racial reason abandons color-blind neutrality for color-conscious history to
explore the rationality and irrationality of policy and practice. But reason fails
to steady the inconstant qualities of racial identity and narrative, inside or
outside adversarial proceedings. Reason also fails to confirm the practical utility
of Critical Race Theory, leaving the race-conscious community prosecution of
cases unmoored. To be effective, theoretical integration must proceed from
practical experimentation.
In crime and criminal justice, experiment carries risk. Designing and testing
alternative prosecutorial practices of state power threaten the public and private
status of people of color. The threats risk further criminalizing racial status and
further encroachment on the racial body, either through incarceration or death.
Due to the hazardous mixing of the prosecutorial function, racial ideology, and
the legal order in the criminal justice system, the architecture of state prosecution should be redrawn carefully. Drafters attentive to the Louima case will note
that the prosecutorial function contains transformative potential. Part of that
potential inheres in law and legal institutions. Anchoring the prosecution function in legal and institutional identities that transform racial meanings is a
reconstructive project.
Definition of the prosecutorial function as a civic reconstructive project weds
prosecutors to a model of community participation. Participatory models of
public and private citizenship allow the joint dismantling of hierarchical structures of racial identity and narrative. They also encourage the cooperative
building of oppositional movements that complement advocacy. Although the
community contemplated is local, the model envisions a boundless historical
community galvanized by racial emancipation. Instances of community participation often follow identity-based criminal violence motivated by differences of
race, class, ethnicity, and gender.
Consider in this regard the 1990-91 Central Park Jogger sexual assault trials
in New York City and the 1998-99 James Byrd murder trials in Jasper, Texas.
Both high-profile criminal trials stress traditional configurations of racial iden-
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tity, racialized narrative, and race-conscious representation. Extracted from
antebellum and postbellum categories of racial status and community, the
figures of black and white identity, the tones of dominant and subordinate
narrative, and the colored codes of racial representation demarcate the trials in
the courts, the streets, and in the popular mind.
The antebellum vision of racial status and community portrays James Byrd
and the black juveniles of the Central Park Jogger case as a common primitive
species of property. Enslaved by claims of natural inferiority and pathology,
blacks and other people of color are pitied in their degradation. Evidence of
inferiority is found in the markings of deviance and defiance, and in signs of
acquiescence and subservience. Empirical descriptions of this misshapen identity resonate in the narratives of racial benevolence, discipline, and domination
still heard in American courtrooms in spite of Reconstruction. Adorned by the
rhetoric of state-sanctioned segregation, the descriptions unfold in the lawyer's
art of race-conscious representation.
Bound up in the idea of innate mental and moral inequality, the postbellum
Reconstruction-era vision of racial status and community tolerates the stereotyped degradation of black identity. Narratives of the abased status of black
identity range descriptively from sharecroppers to welfare recipients. The accounts emphasize the marginality of, and the propriety of control over, the black
chattel of the antebellum period. Absent from these accounts is the ambition of
moral perfectibility. Rather than instill this ambition or aspire to the union of
interracial community, emancipation unlocks space for racial resistance and
dissidence.
Opening sociolegal space for civil rights and civil disobedience through the
partial vesting of political and economic rights brings nothing to the ambivalence toward interracial community radiating throughout the law and ethics of
the criminal justice system. Discernible in the prosecutorial treatment of differentiation and sameness among defendants and victims, that ambivalence affects
legal and ethical commitments to race-neutrality. Regimes based on sameness
appear sympathetic to color-blind rules of advocacy, even when interracial
community declines as a result. By contrast, regimes founded on differentiation
seem more receptive to color-conscious rules, even if anathema to the reigning
jurisprudence of blind faith criminal prosecution. Rectifying such deep-seated
ambivalence toward interracial community requires the racial recognition of
difference in law and ethics.
The Central Park Jogger and the James Byrd trials reveal prosecutorial norms
and narratives of strong conviction but weak commitment to interracial community. The trials, ignited by the violence of gang rape and lynching, struggle to
regenerate interracial community. In the Central Park Jogger case, the struggle
is situated among the families, friends, and neighbors of a cluster of young
black and Hispanic men, ages fourteen to eighteen, charged in the beating and
rape, and their victim, a twenty-nine-year-old white woman from a community
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of well-educated affluence.' °° The woman, beaten into a coma at night in
Central Park, nearly died from multiple fractures and lacerations.' 0 ' In the
James Byrd case, the struggle for community is located among the families,
friends, and neighbors of three young white men, ages twenty-three to thirtyone, charged with kidnapping and murder, and of their victim, James Byrd, a
black disabled forty-nine-year-old former vacuum cleaner salesman and father
of three. 102 The defendants, at least two of whom were avowed white supremacists, 10 3 kidnapped and assaulted Byrd, spray-painted his face, chained him to a
pickup truck, and dragged him alive and conscious along a three-mile rural
paved road until a concrete culvert decapitated his body.'°4
Despite the good faith labor of state prosecutors, the Central Park Jogger case
inflamed racial tensions in New York City, inciting claims of disparate treatment
and invidious classification. The James Byrd trials, in comparison, reignited
local efforts toward community reformation and interracial acceptance. The
color-blind commitments of state prosecutors fueled those efforts, aided by the
altruistic posture of the Byrd family toward the defendants' families and local
and national communities. Displayed in public statements of reconciliation, this
family-initiated altruism points to the real but limited promise of raceconscious, community-oriented prosecution.
The Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials show the limitations of
race-conscious, community-oriented prosecution within a tradition riven by
contest over antebellum and postbellum racial status. The contest entangles
identity, culture, and society. Antebellum ethos denotes black racial status in
terms of natural inferiority and moral degeneracy. In the Central Park Jogger
trials, racial identity cuts across the antebellum categories of class and gender.
Postbellum ethos adheres to the barriers of segregated community while allowing partial integration of political and economic spheres of participation. In the

100. See TIMoTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDIcTs: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 19-23 (1992).
101. See id. at 56, 129-31, 241-42. The two Central Park Jogger trials and five plea bargains
produced sentences ranging from six months to fifteen years in jail. See id. at 54, 288-312, 319-20.
102. See Terri Langford, Third Trial to Begin in JasperDeath: Prosecutorsto Focus on Suspect's 2
Stories, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 25, 1999, at IA; Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, Last of Three
Trialsin DraggingDeath Starting in Jasper,Hous. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1999, at At3.
103. See Patty Reinert, Byrd's Slaying Called the Basis for Hate Group: Prosecutor Says King
Wanted 'Respect'for New Racist Gang, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 17, 1999, at Al ; Richard Stewart, Attorney:
Defendant Not Racist: Jasper Court Told "He Has No Motive," Hous. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1999, at A15;
Richard Stewart, Suspect's Writings Point to Role as Organizerof 'Rebel Soldiers,' Hous. CHRON., Feb.
17, 1999, at Al.
104. See Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, Doctor Details "Devastating Pain" of Dragging:
Prosecutors Finish Case with Gruesome Testimony, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 17, 1999, at A33; Barry
Shlachter, Officer Says Jasper Victim's Pants Taken Down, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 15, 1999,
at 1; Bruce Tomaso, Prosecution Rests in 2nd Jasper Trial: Doctor Catalogs List of Injuries to Byrd,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, at 29A. The three James Byrd trials ended in two death
sentences and one sentence of life in prison. See Patty Reinert et al., Jasper Killer Gets Death Penalty:
A Smirking King Shows No Remorse, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26, 1999, at Al; Second Man Convicted in
Dragging Death, N.Y. 'MEs, Sept. 21, 1999, at A18; Third Defendant Is Convicted in Dragging Death
in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A29.
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James Byrd trials, identity becomes ensnarled in postbellum culture and society.
These intersections reproduce normative and narrative hierarchies of racial
status and community. Status hierarchies reenact the moral-formal dilemmas of
representation in race trials. Counterposing abolitionist morality and formalist
advocacy, the dilemmas strain the framework of a prosecutorial tradition imprisoned by antebellum and postbellum racial ethos. Antebellum ethos consigns
racial community to segregation. Postbellum ethos hazards ethical denunciation
by permitting interracial political and socioeconomic participation. In the same
way, prosecutorial outreach that dislodges settled status and community divisions for purposes of economic improvement or social redemption chances
resentment and retaliation.
Ethics rules govern the prosecution function in federal and state forums under
the auspices of the American Bar Association, state courts and bar associations,
federal courts and agencies, and advisory groups. Rule governance occurs
within an adversary system shadowed by antebellum and postbellum status
traditions. Admission in the prosecutorial literature of the asymmetry of the
adversarial process and the danger of unchecked discretion in charging, investigation, plea-bargaining, trial practice, and sentencing hardly makes mention of
moral incentive and racial motive. Likewise, contemporary accounts of prosecutorial impropriety and discipline scarcely refer to the moral purpose and racial
impetus behind prosecutions. Instead, the accounts present a neutral position on
the ethical regulation of prosecutorial roles.
B.

PROSECUTORIAL ROLES

Regulatory inattention by federal and state authorities allows for discretion in
fulfilling the multiple roles of the prosecutorial office. The office includes the
roles of constitutional guardian, manager, professional custodian, cultural warden, community activist, and moral hero. At their best, the roles direct institutional functions to promote procedural fairness, organizational efficiency, and
substantive justice. Those institutional functions determine the limits and prospects of prosecutorial discretion.
Consider the constitutional role of the prosecutor. Deduced from the moral
structure of the Constitution, this role obtains guidance from due process and
equal protection values. The equal protection norms of dignity and equality
enriched the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials. The indignity of rape
and lynching by pickup truck is indisputable. The indignities deny the Central
Park jogger and James Byrd moral valuation and deprive them of equal standing
in their own communities. The felony indictment of multiple defendants in the
Central Park Jogger case and the capital indictment of the three white defendants in the James Byrd case indicate an even-handed attempt to enforce the
constitutional norm of equality.
Racial equality summons egalitarian treatment of the self by others in private
and public domains. Racial dignity relates to the physical and psychological
integrity of the self. The Central Park Jogger prosecutors championed dignitary
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and equality norms out of concern for individual victims of group-inspired
racial violence. The James Byrd prosecutors advocated the same norms out of
sympathy for communities of color. Such egalitarian sentiments drive the
prosecutorial commitment to procedural fairness, however flawed. When encircled by the adversary system, that commitment falters in vindicating the civil
rights of the Central Park jogger and James Byrd. The lack of a civil rights
complaint in either case shows the constraints of the prosecutorial role in
safeguarding the public and private rights of victims, and their communities, in
cases of racial violence.
Further constraints arise from the punitive imperatives of the prosecutorial
role. At work in the Central Park Jogger case, the imperatives dictate the
charging and trial of selected juveniles as adults. This sanction stunts the
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system. Admittedly, the punitive
treatment of certain juvenile defendants may benefit the immediate victim of
violence and the community exposed to such violence. But it jeopardizes victim
and defendant-community reconciliation in race cases. The shifting weight of
prosecutorial constraints and imperatives corresponds to the hierarchical ordering of values in the criminal justice system. The institutional priority of that
order follows the racial compass of antebellum and postbellum ideology, relegating the offspring of chattel to the harsh discipline warranted by immutable
status.
Racial ideology also impinges on the institutional role of the prosecutor.
Assigned to a supervisory function within the criminal justice system, the role
encompasses the oversight of law enforcement. This organizational role involves the management of institutional command structures and bureaucratic
operations. Managerial discretion over institutional decisionmaking and procedures serves a regulative function. That discretion draws on ethical considerations. In the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd cases, the prosecutorial
supervision of police and sheriff officers, investigators, and experts raised
ethical concerns about the status and treatment of race in the indictment, arrest,
trial, and sentencing of the defendants. When federal and state authorities
pursue a joint investigation-as in the cooperative engagement of the U.S.
Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of
Texas, and the FBI in the Byrd trials-concerns about prosecutorial overreaching and abuse escalate.
Similar concerns pertain to the professional role of the prosecutor. Acting as a
minister of justice, the prosecutor controls the advocacy and adjudication of a
criminal case, the latter in the circumscribed context of plea-bargaining. His
power and prerogative extend to charging, discovery, pretrial motions, trial
practice, and sentencing. Each exercise of prosecutorial prerogative triggers
discretion. Antebellum and postbellum value competition decides the discrete
manner of discretion applied. Historically committed to the denigration of black
racial status and black-white interracial community, the competition results in
an essentializing construction of race. Superior in its emancipatory mandate, the
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postbellum construction at least removes basic political and economic obstacles
to integration while holding segregation intact.
The normative prescription of postbellum community merges the jurispathic
and jurisgenerative purposes of law and lawyering. At once emancipatory and
segregative, the prescription creates and destroys the dialogic and associational
freedom indispensable to community-building. This simultaneous opening and
closing of social space privileges white-dominated racial hierarchy. The clash of
community-decentered, deviance-based jurispathic discretion and communitycentered, redemption-based jurisgenerative discretion dictates whether prosecutors forsake or safeguard the rights of defendants, victims, and their associated
communities.
The deviance-based jurispathic discretion exhibited by federal and state
prosecutors in the trials of Lemrick Nelson, Charles Price, and the Central Park
Jogger juveniles diluted the moral integrity of the defendants and their racially
subordinated communities, thereby undermining the grounds for cross-racial
dialogue and association with white victims and their racially dominant communities. The collapse of individual dialogue and group association decenters
cross-racial community reinforcing postbellum racial segregation. The contrasting redemption-based jurisgenerative discretion haltingly displayed by federal
and state prosecutors in the trials of Abner Louima and James Byrd affirmed the
moral agency of the defendants only to the extent necessary to assign blame and
allot culpability. Beyond that point, the prosecutorial deployment of racialized
narratives actually diminished the integrity of the defendant police officers and
white supremacists, and their racially dominant communities. Essential to public redemption, defendant integrity must survive the disciplinary process of
prosecution even in a diminished form. Prosecutors' narrative exploitation of
white-black duality and white police violence in the Louima case, and white
supremacy and Ku Klux Klan invective in the Byrd case, abraded rather than
preserved the individual and community integrity of the defendants under the
glare of public moral judgment. This erosion is fatal to public redemption and
fails to recenter the cross-racial dialogue and association fundamental to community. Without redemptive dialogue and association, neither federal nor state
prosecutors will be able to reconcile the preservation of victim and community
retributive rights with the obligations of defendant and community mercy.
The Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials contextualize victims' lives, in
death and in recovery, and defendants' lives, in isolation and in shattered
community. Contextualizing victims credits the dignity of personhood in community. Contextualizing defendants uncloaks exclusion and locates alienation in
community. Reinserting the defendant into an integrated community context
fosters the values of atonement and forgiveness. Introduction of those values
enlarges prosecutorial duties to include a jury and public-focused pedagogy of
race, crime, and segregation. Teaching juries and the public about the impact of
race and racial impoverishment on crime recollects the deformed community
shared by victims and perpetrators of racial violence.
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Moving from the recollection of broken community to repair calls for a
cultural role for prosecutors. In the prosecution of racial violence, that role often
goes unfulfilled. Prosecutors in the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials
illustrate this reluctance. Ingrained by antebellum and postbellum habits, they
confine their teaching of community reparation and restoration to racial lessons
of natural subordination and necessary segregation. These instructional narratives submerge black and white agents of violence in contexts of cultural and
social pathology. Manifested here in the violence of asserted white supremacists
and black and Hispanic delinquents, pathology of this sort persuades prosecutors to recommend preventive detention, imprisonment, and even death.
None of those recommendations and their corresponding racial lessons satisfy
the alternative cultural function of inculcating virtue into law and advocacy. The
virtue of victim- and defendant-centered community is grounded in dignity and
integrity. Both victim and defendant deserve dignity in prosecution. Individual
dignity exerts a collective pull, tugging at relationships to multigenerational
families, friends, and neighbors. Accrued gradually, the relationships acquire the
character of community.
Culturally and spatially distinct, community character also deserves respect
in prosecution. Respect concedes the integrity of a community's moral, cultural,
and social commitments. The Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials exhibit
very different kinds of individual and community commitments. In the Central
Park Jogger case, the commitment to segregated community emboldens prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, and defendant families, pitting one against
another. In the James Byrd trials, the commitment to an incompletely integrated
community connects the victim's family to black and white neighbors. Jamie
Byrd, the youngest of Bird's daughters, repeatedly sounded multiracial themes
of connection and integration in her public remarks. 10 5 Moreover, Texas state
prosecutors depicted the Byrd lynching as an obstacle to integrationist progress.
The evidence of prosecutorial commitment to community integration in the
James Byrd trials falls short of adducing a community-oriented prosecutorial
role. Yet, even in its nascent state, the dimensions of that role seem outwardly
apparent. An important dimension relates to the treatment of a violence-scarred
community as a collective victim. This collective notion of injury proffers the
experience of common harm and the possibility of common remedy. Restoring
the sense of a collective or common entity demands the renewal of public trust.
The role of community trustee restricts the unbridled prosecution of race cases
in deference to a larger good, however vague.
The prosecutorial trustee function splices social and relational contract theory.
Set down in contractual obligation, the trusteeship function operates in alliance
with community through a covenant of trust and reciprocity. Weakly supported
by the norms of the criminal law and the criminal justice system, this fragile
covenant relies on local networks of family and friendship, community group
105. See Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence, supra note 2, at 821 n.55.
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organization, and neighborhood mobilization for backing. Formal and informal
people's networks help bond prosecutors to communities. Even when the
networks are underdeveloped, they divulge the need and the potential for more
than punitive sanction. Recognizing the need for forgiveness and mercy in
prosecuting individuals guilty of breaching community and legal norms activates the trustee function. Prosecutors in the Central Park Jogger and the James
Byrd trials omitted that function. Rather than espouse a jurisgenerative ethos of
community constituted by atonement, forgiveness, and reparation, they applied
traditional practices of jurispathic prosecution motivated by penal norms of
defendant punishment and community vengeance.
In the main, prosecutors squander the opportunity for heralding racial reconciliation. The Central Park Jogger and the James Byrd trials supplied ample
opportunity to enunciate publicly the conciliatory norms of mercy and forgiveness. The invocation of those norms gives credence to a moral prosecutorial
role. Heroic in tone, that moral role arises in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Because the standard exercise of discretion occurs within antebellum
and postbellum frameworks, prosecutors struggle to perform a moral role independent of state fidelity to penal sanction, racial hierarchy, and adversarial fervor.
Struggling to gain independence from the jurispathic ethos of the criminal
justice system and the punitive commands of state violence requires practical moral reasoning. Practical reasoning that attaches moral considerations
to legal decisionmaking cultivates virtue for the self, society, and the state.
Prosecutorial trumpeting of color-blind equality in the punitive discourse of
the James Byrd trials authenticated the virtue of even-handed treatment.
This virtue-based reasoning contributed to the reconciliation of longsegregated communities in Texas. Yet, facilitating community reconciliation
through the moral pronouncement of color-blind equality in capital punishment under theories of deterrence and retribution turns the prosecutorial
ethic of race-conscious community outreach on its head. Envisioned here,
the ethic hews to the redemptive value of mercy, not the punitive value of
equitable sanction. Instilling the virtue of forgiveness in the discretionary
canons and regulatory standards guiding the prosecution function seems
plausible given the history of lawyer-engineered reform movements and the
richness of emerging theories of race and identity.
Unfortunately, the plausibility of the normative reformation of the prosecutorial function in no way guarantees its feasibility. The values of equality and
retribution offer powerful normative challenge to an ethic of race-conscious
prosecution in the Central Park Jogger and the James Byrd trials. At both trials,
prosecutors encountered narrow traditions of statutory discretion and institutional regulation that inhibit an enlarged sense of community function. The
history of lawyer-dominated law reform movements tenders a meager sense of
community engagement. Furthermore, remedial theories of race and identity too
often undermine community sensibility in the very act of construing it, thereby
attaining an ironic but debilitating sense of solidarity.
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To endorse individual dignity and community integrity in the prosecution of
racial violence constitutes a gesture of reconciliation. Prosecutorial norms
permit such reconciliation even as they adversely affect the community. Normative critique of the current prosecution function in the field of racially motivated
violence points out alternative prosecutorial roles suitable to reconciling groups
devastated by violence. The roles carry attendant discourses, some conducive,
and others contrary, to prosecutorial practices of community activism, outreach,
and education.
Rebuilding community after major public incidents of interracial violence
calls on a diverse battery of advocacy practices. The Central Park Jogger and
James Byrd trials show that many of these community-oriented practices flow
from the norms of prosecutorial discretion and the constitutional, statutory, and
common-law narratives of the criminal justice system. This showing bears the
ambiguity of normative and narrative contest. In fact, the trials suffer the
internal tension of race-neutrality and racial consciousness. The same showing
cloaks the notion of community in vagueness, here and elsewhere. In the
high-profile trials at issue, community stumbles into different forms, both
conspicuous and indecipherable. This fluctuation simply may prove the trials to
be unrepresentative. But a more inclusive, empirical sampling cataloging descriptions of the role, function, and regulation of prosecutors in race cases may fare
no better.
To shed controversy, reconsider the norms and narratives of the prosecutorial
function. Fairly described, they appear to construct multiple prosecutorial roles,
each accompanied by a set of burdens characterized by discretionary freedom
and constraint. The roles roughly correspond to the varied functions of the
prosecutorial office: constitutional, institutional, professional, cultural, social,
and moral. Ideally, the functions abide by considerations of procedural fairness,
organizational efficiency, and substantive justice. Even so, their impact on law
and advocacy, as well as on culture and society, may be overstated. Overstatement may warp assessments of prosecutorial discretion, badly estimating the
freedoms and the constraints impinging on prosecutors in race cases.
Nevertheless, the evaluation of the cultural and societal impact of prosecutorial norms and narratives in race trials must go forward in pursuit of a fruitful
basis for a relationship between criminal lawyers and community. Contemporary law reform movements (civil rights, welfare rights, women's rights, and
gay or lesbian rights) outside of the criminal justice system disclose a fragile
basis for that relationship. Postmodem concepts of racial identity and community add a ramshackle, disorganized quality to the relationship, reducing community to an incoherent, almost utopian idea ill-fitted to restrain or overcome
violence.
III. A RACE-CONSCIOUS

COMMUNITY ETHIC OF PROSECUTION

To prevail in theory and practice, a race-conscious community ethic of
prosecution must meet objections from epistemology, ethics, and practicality. A
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threshold objection challenges the claim of prosecutor, defendant, and victim
community consensus. The claim of consensus, and the weaker contention of
goal correspondence, applies at three levels. At the highest level of generality,
the claim refers to relationships among prosecutors, defendants, victims, and
associated communities. At an intermediate level, the claim concerns the relationships between defendant-communities and victim-communities. At a threshold
level, the claim pertains to the relationships between defendants and their
communities, and between victims and their communities. Empirically, the
claim of consensus and goal correspondence among prosecutor, defendant, and
victim fares poorly at each level of interaction. This failure deepens in racial
settings. In fact, since the advent of the civil rights movement and the war on
crime, communities of color have been beset by internal conflict and fragmentation. Less battered jurisprudentially, the claim of consensus still may be unobtainable. Racially constricted dialogue may prove inadequate to reach consensus.
The tautness of racial conversations and relations renders the claim further
indefensible. The saving presumption of collective reciprocity and voluntary
deference seems counterfactual in race cases.
The adversarial system elicits a second objection alluding to structural barriers blocking prosecutor, defendant, and victim community consensus. Both
liberal and critical scholars of the legal profession mention the endemic adversarial tendencies to sequester opposing litigants as combatants and to divide
class litigants into competing groups. Systemic isolation and conflict undermine
consensus-making agreement between individuals and among groups otherwise
allied or in opposition. Striving for mutual agreement among the parties to
race-conscious community prosecution thus seems not only futile, but also
likely to subordinate and silence defendants, victims, and communities too
weak to overcome prosecutorial power.
The scope of prosecutorial authority brings forth a third objection pointing to
the imbalance of power among prosecutors, defendants, and victims in negotiating consensus. Entering into community dialogue or collective deliberation
seems far-fetched in the context of hierarchical relationships. Hierarchy suppresses dialogue and skews deliberation. Although the impulse for cross-racial
dialogue and deliberation may carry on, it appears misplaced in circumstances
of unequal standing and paternalism.
The circumstances surrounding the prosecutor-led negotiation of consensus
among defendants, victims, and their affiliated communities prompts a fourth
objection relating to culture and society. Insofar as cultural and socioeconomic
circumstances and prevailing political currents manufacture the shape of race
trials-situating identity, designating narrative, and stipulating color-coded representation-reform of lawyering and ethics regimes seems unavailing. Indeed,
on the strength of this objection, neither lawyering nor ethics can rescue the
participants of race trials. For critics, rescue must come from politics, culture,
and society, not law. The erosion of civil rights and the disintegration of biracial
coalitions support the turn away from lawyering solutions.

2001]

RACE PROSECUTORS, RACE DEFENDERS

2255

The facial incompatibility of a race-conscious, community-based ethic of
prosecutorial discretion and colorblind constitutional tradition sparks a fifth
objection. Undeniably, race-conscious standards of prosecutorial discretion may
run afoul of strictly read equal protection principles. But strict construction is
nowhere compelled by equal protection. Surely, equality principles often oblige
more expansive readings. Like state-enacted race-conscious procedures and
remedies, prosecutor-espoused race-conscious standards confront the tension of
constitutional contraction and expansion. That confrontation saps the axioms of
liberal jurisprudence and the constitutional tradition of color-blind adjudication.
The mutability of racial identity and the inconsistency of racialized narratives
further pummels prosecutorial standards of race-conscious discretion, thereby
providing a sixth objection. The Louima case shows racial identity wrenched by
categories of color, race, ethnicity, nationality, and sexuality. It also demonstrates the variation in racialized narrative when enunciated by prosecutors,
defense lawyers, defendants, victims, and judges. In addition to categorical
overlap and discrepancy, racial identity and narrative suffer the inscription of a
white-black dichotomy. Reiterated in both high- and low-profile trials, this
inscribed dichotomy misapprehends mixed-race classification and racial gradation for the duality of black and white.
Stubbornly fixed in race-conscious prosecutorial discretion, that duality leads
to a seventh objection based on the claim of white-majority harm. This expressive or representational harm occurs when state prosecutorial action appears to
favor minority interests. Theories of expressive and representational harm apply
equally to white-majority and black-minority communities, though the raceconscious standards proposed here anticipate injury only to the dominant racial
group. The theories project the harm of community stigma and the loss of
public faith in government.
Public faith is crucial to the success of race-conscious, community-oriented
prosecutorial discretion. Loss of faith conjures a last objection tied to the
predicted decline of voluntary cross-racial community. Decline results from
prosecutorial intervention that displaces alternative community-based, citizenled modes of racial reconciliation. This mode of reconciliation fuses collective
action with diversity and legal rights with political mobilization. To satisfy the
norm of equal citizenship, mobilization must revere racial inclusion. Private
market forces and American populist histories are barren of such reverence. The
crude conception of community-based, popular justice unleashed by the antebellum and postbellum forces of history, together with concerns about constitutional incompatibility, practical unmanageability, expressive and representational
harm, and compromised voluntary cross-racial community tarnish the prospects
of a race-conscious, community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion.
IV.

DEFENDING THE VIOLENCE OF RACE

Impediments to the installation of a race-conscious, community-oriented
model of prosecution in the current framework of the adversarial system rise up
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as well in the criminal defense context. Because the defense function evolves
from the moral obligation to shield the poor from state-inflicted violence, 0 6 the
impediments to formulating a race-conscious defender approach to race trials
seem even more formidable. The conventional approach to the defense process
deems guilt and innocence irrelevant to criminal trials.' 0 7 More germane is the
historic inequity10 8 and rationing' 0 9 of state resources in the defense of the
accused. These scant resources produce models for indigent defender systems
sparing of innovation." Entrapped by the political economy and custom of
unequal adversarial engagement, defense lawyers fall prey to plea-bargaining"'
and paternalism. 1 2 Neither plea-bargaining nor paternalism supplies a raceconscious, community-oriented approach to defenders in trials of racially motivated violence.
The prior criminal defense cases surveyed in this project yield precisely such
an approach, albeit inchoate and haphazardly tried. The cases glean a raceconscious, community-oriented approach to advocacy from the disparate trials
of Damian Williams and Henry Watson," 13 the Alabama-based United Mans of
America, 1 4 and Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price. Although the trials reveal
different conceptions of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral
representation, they point to a basic mutability of identity, instability of narrative, and color coding of neutrality. The fluctuations of identity, narrative, and
color-coded advocacy stem from the interchanges of procedural and substantive
laws, judges and juries, defendants and victims, prosecutors and defenders, and
106. See David Luban, Are CriminalDefenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1757-58 (1993);
Abbe Smith, For Tom Joad and Tom Robinson: The Moral Obligation to Defend the Poor, 1997 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 869, 874-77, 885-88.
107. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 491-95, 509-14 (2000); see
also DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-65, at
126-80 (1998) (discussing the development of the adversarial criminal trial in England and the duty of
counsel zealously to defend the client regardless of guilt or innocence).
108. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 104-27 (1924); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF N.Y. & NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDERS ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 34-47 (1959); Chester
L. Mirsky, The Political Economy and Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917-1998, 1997 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 893, 1013-17.
109. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to
the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 784-815.
110. See Note, Gideon s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2065-78 (2000).
111. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1038-75 (2000).
112. See MICHAEL MELLO, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VERSUS THEODORE JOHN KACZYNSKI
189-213 (1999); H. Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the Accused
and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 729-65 (2000); see also C.
Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row Volunteering,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUtRY 849, 854-59 (2000) (questioning the propriety of criminal defenders overriding
clients' voluntary decision to waive habeas appeals after receiving a death sentence); David Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 487-93 (addressing phenomenon of
lawyers overriding client values and preferences for nonmaximizing ends in purported pursuit of
maximizing client ends).
113. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1301-20.
114. See Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 2, at 1074-84.
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culture and society. Unconfined by law and the adversarial system, the interchanges feed on stereotypes of color to fix a secure sense of racial hierarchy and
status. In race trials, this sense of caste security is ephemeral. Repeatedly the
case studies demonstrate that identity, narrative, and color-coded advocacy shift
in an ongoing contest of accommodation and resistance to well-entrenched
racial hierarchy.
Criminal defenders reproduce white-black racial hierarchies in race trials.
They veil hierarchy in constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, and
common-law application. The colors of black and white adorn the discourses of
constitutionalism, legislation, and the common law. Evoked in speech and
symbolic conduct, those discourses naturalize color-coded inferences and colorconscious stereotypes about racial identity. Both inference and stereotype equate
black racial identity with moral inferiority. The precept of inferiority is rhetorically encoded in the defense of racially motivated violence.
Race trial defenses assemble color-coded claims that overtly and covertly
appeal to demeaning racial stereotypes. The stereotypes contain racial identity
judgments of moral inferiority. Criminal defenders stand unaccountable for
expressing judgments of inferiority in narrative and story. Earmarks of the
adversary system, narrative partisanship, and nonaccountability receive widespread acceptance in criminal defense advocacy.' 15 Apparently, they also obtain
the freely given assent of defendant clients.
Liberal theories of moral agency decree the treatment of clients as
subjects. Subjectivity enables defendant-client assent to racialized narrative,
even when demeaning. Contingent on instrumental lawyer strategy and
voluntary client self-construction, the narrative forms part of a natural or a
necessary racial order. The ranking of this order bottoms on a naturally
defective black moral character or a deprivation-induced black moral deficiency. This strategic ranking of racial inferiority legitimates subordinating
narratives about black character and conduct under the aegis of race-neutral
representation. The stance of race-neutrality in this way shields color-coded
criminal defense advocacy.
The case of Damian Williams and Henry Watson illustrates the color-coded
defense of race trials. 1 16 To defeat charges of attempted murder and aggravated
mayhem in the beating of Reginald Denny and others, the Williams-Watson
defense lawyers controverted evidence of intent and voluntary conduct. They
sparked controversy by introducing a "group contagion" theory of mob-incited
diminished capacity.'1 7 Mounted as an exculpatory defense, the social psychology-based theory intimates that young black males as a group, and the black

115. See Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER, 18, 18-29 (Rodney Uphoff ed., 1995).
116. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1301-20.
117. See Record at 8628-29, People v. Williams (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. BA058116) [hereinafter
Record].
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community as a whole, share a pathological tendency to commit acts of
violence in collective outings.' 18 Both Williams and Watson are young, male,
and black. The defense team supplemented this evidence with defendantinspired narratives of deviance and defiance." 9
The Williams-Watson trial record is replete with interlacing and sometimes
dissonant deviance and defiance narratives.' 20 The narratives construct the
identity of young black males in the antebellum terms of bestial pathology and
insurrectionist rage, projecting images of good and bad young black men. This
identity projection recreates the racial dichotomy of virtue and sin. Under its
distended terms, to be born black is itself an act of original sin fatal to moral
character. Distilling racial identity into an objective, unalterable quality of
human nature robs blacks of liberal subjectivity in the making of identity and in
the crafting of community. The tendency of white and black criminal defense
lawyers to mix deviance and defiance narratives in race trials imprints bestial
pathology into the sociolegal texture of racial identity and community. This
tendency reemerges in the defense of white-on-black violence.
Defenders of the 1981 Ku Klux Klan lynching of Michael Donald recapitulated the identity-making function of legal narrative in the context of race and
1 22
community bias. 12 Employing several lynching defenses (jury nullification,
victim denigration, 1 23 and diminished capacity 1 24), they spun narratives of
cloaked racial invective and hatred seeking to captivate the white imagination
and its sympathy. The narrative defenses of jury nullification and victim denigration appeal overtly to racial hierarchy. Nullification narratives invoke white
racial supremacy. Denigration narratives restate black racial inferiority. The
narrative defense of diminished capacity implores hierarchy by more covert
reference, remarking favorably on the psychological disfigurement of a rightly
segregated community.
Resonant of hierarchy, the racialized narratives accompanying the lynching
defenses of nullification, denigration, and diminished capacity denote difference
in sociolegal status. The defense of nullification, for example, petitions community members of a jury to affirm their commitment to racial difference and
subordination by overriding the course of law and the weight of evidence. The
affirmation encapsulates the moral sentiment of antebellum and postbellum
community to rectify superficial alterations in racial status. For defenders of
Klan lynching, jury-featured race trials provide a forum for disenfranchised

118. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1304.
119. See id. at 1309.
120. See, e.g., Record, supra note 117, at 5124, 5131. One witness, a police officer, testified that
Williams confronted him prior to the outbreak of violence, stating: "Fuck you. You ain't shit. If you was
any kind of nigger, you would be out here with us." Id.
121. See Alfieri, Lynching Ethics, supra note 2, at 1074-84.
122. See id. at 1077-79.
123. See id. at 1079-81.
124. See id. at 1081-84.
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white citizens to participate in overturning the temporary realignment of racial
hierarchy.
The defense of victim denigration also confirms racial status hierarchy by
imparting narratives of black deviance. Deviant imagery degrades the worth of
the black victim, thereby elevating the status of the white lawbreaker. Validating
the debased status of black victims bolsters claims of moral, physical, and
mental inferiority. The claims compose the moral rationale for lynching, segregation, and jury-granted white clemency.
The defense of diminished capacity reinforces racial status hierarchy by
absolving white lawbreakers of moral and criminal culpability. Absolution
recognizes and rewards the overwrought, almost delusional, commitment to
unalloyed white dominance. Defenders contend that the depth of white commitment to racial supremacy induces an emotional state of rage. Swept up in a
populist battle to reverse private and public advances in political, cultural, and
socioeconomic integration, white lawbreakers commit acts of racial violence
without individual or collective remorse. Discarding the image of white savagery, the defense revitalizes the exculpatory narrative of distraught white
innocence.
The exculpatory narrative of racial innocence extends to the defense of black
defendants. The race trials of Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price for the 1991
murder of Yankel Rosenbaum and the incitement of interracial violence both
alluded to the racialized defense of diminished capacity. 25 Noteworthy for
dueling race-contaminated narratives in opening statements, witness examinations, and closing arguments, the trials sparkled with defense claims of white
hierarchical bias, manifested in the acts of police officers and prosecutors, and
shared prosecutorial and defense assertions of black deviant pathology demonstrated in family disfunction, juvenile delinquency, and drug abuse. 126 These
commingled narratives triggered prosecution and defense motions (defendant
adult transfer and judicial recusal) 127 that concurrently asserted the defective,
indeed irredeemable, state of white and black moral character.
Race-neutral ethics codes tolerate color-coded criminal defense narratives.
Tolerance of color-coded advocacy rests on makeshift contractarian and communitarian accounts of liberal theory. The contractarian account builds on the
presuppositions of moral agency and rational individualism. In this code-ratified
account, the defendant-client independently decides the objectives and collaboratively consults on the means of representation. On this account, the client's
autonomous embrace of racialized defenses accords with the rational and
voluntary decisionmaking of a liberal agent.
The communitarian account weaves deliberative and third-party considerations customarily relegated to the periphery of the codes. In this similarly

125. See Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1323-39.
126. See id. at 1332-39.
127. See id. at 1323-24.
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rule-sanctioned account, the defendant-client approves racialized defense strategies as a result of client-lawyer color-blind deliberative counseling. Standing
alone, code deliberation may be inclusive or exclusive of public or third-party
interests. The byproduct of deliberative inclusivity is accommodation; for exclusivity, the end result is preclusion. These distinct outcomes limit the influence of
communitarian counseling. Code-encouraged discretionary dialogue in counseling affords little moral incentive to boost that influence in race trials.
The roughly cobbled contractarian and communitarian accounts deduced
from current ethics codes condone the deformity of client and community racial
identity constructions advocated in race trials. The codes countenance this
deformation by allowing the marshaling of color-coded deviance and defiance
defenses. The defenses acquire their legitimacy from the presumption that a
defendant-client may freely adopt a self-abasing narrative. Adoption retains its
legitimacy only when the client arrives at his subordinating self-description
independently or through consensual counseling.
Ethical forbearance of this destructive defender practice rests in part on the
rhetoric of color blindness that drapes the prejudicial undergirding of race trials.
It rests in comparable part on the belief that the desecration of race in the public
sphere of law bears no relation to subjective racial identity in the private sphere
of family and community. This separation of public and private spheres partitions law and legal discourse from society and shared subjectivity. That division
excises the discursive cause of racial harm, thereby erasing the taint of stigma
injury for defendants, their families, and their communities. Equally important,
the division shelters defenders from any accountability for voicing racialized
defenses.
Two centuries of defender-facilitated racial stigma, however, are not erased
by the sleight-of-hand partitioning of social reality. Defenders' approving stance
toward racialized defenses, and its ethical correlates, works to preserve racial
status boundaries in law and society. For defendants, the boundaries of racial
caste traverse public and private spheres. Denial of the conjunction or the
merging of public and private spheres in law and legal advocacy permits
criminal defenders to maintain a color-blind stance of nonaccountability. This
stance dominates lawyer appraisal of the moral consequences of defendant
self-subordination for law and society. It also governs measurement of the harm
done to the defendant and third-party or public interests.
Remedial regulation of criminal defense advocacy under an alternative raceconscious community ethic of professional responsibility hinges on the principle of lawyer moral accountability. This accountability extends to racial harm
that disfigures the character of individual defendants and tarnishes the integrity
of third parties or communities. The ethic combines both liberal and postmodern precepts. The initial precept, race-consciousness, posits race and racial
difference as fundamental to a client's identity and, therefore, central to his
moral decisionmaking process. An additional precept, contingency, asserts that
a client's moral character and identity develop in contexts enlivened by family,
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friends, and community. A final precept, collectivity, conceives lawyers and
clients as collaborators in devising strategies of representation that are equally
effective in defending the client from state violence and in preventing harm to
his own dignitary and community interests.
Interweaving this cluster of alternative precepts into a feasible ethic entertains two rule-based approaches. A strong version of the ethic winnows from
long-standing traditions of lawyer independence and moral activism. It requires
criminal defense lawyers unilaterally to refuse deployment of deviance-based
racialized strategies, except to nullify a racially discriminatory prosecution. A
weak version borrows from well-known lawyer advisory and counseling traditions. It encourages client-lawyer counseling dialogue on the meaning of racial
identity and community and on the potential harm posed by racialized defense
strategies. This type of dialogue tests defendant-deviance narratives against the
background norms of dignity and integrity, weighing the risk of harm to
personhood and to community.
Denunciations of these unilateral and bilateral remedial prescriptions stretch
widely, finding fault with the abandonment of the public-private distinction, the
validation of identity-based harm to dignitary and community interests, and the
curtailment of the criminal defense lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy. To
confess fault in the tempering of classical defender commitments is to point out
fault in the disaggregation of the conjoined public and private experience of
law, in the negation of dignity and community norms, and in overstepping the
limits of loyalty and zealous advocacy. Staging the antisubordination politics of
Critical Race Theory in the theater of criminal justice, where it might explode
racial hierarchies and enhance equality in law and society, presents an opportunity to temper the bloated principles of criminal defense advocacy. This stab at a
theory of racial conciliation nowhere demands the abdication of professional
role or the wholesale repudiation of ethical duty. The proposed ethic of raceconscious community representation merely seeks to reopen and to reincorporate the suppressed normative premises of liberal legalism in fashioning an
enlarged vision of lawyer duty and client or third-party injury in race trials.

V.

DEFENDING A RACE-CONSCIOUS ETHIC OF REPRESENTATION

The ethic of race-conscious responsibility transforms the liberal regime of
color-blind criminal defense practice by revitalizing the foundational norms of
dignity and community in the context of racial violence. The transformative
race-ing of defense practice challenges the identity-making rituals of criminal
lawyers, especially the tendency to construct racial difference out of the image
of deviance and out of the narrative of inferiority. Recapitulated in the instant
case studies, this tendency reenacts racial subordination in advocacy. Halting
that reenactment in the criminal justice system requires the reintegration of
dignitary and community values in legal ethics.
The call for the restoration of values in the legal profession resounds in
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contemporary ethics literature.' 2 8 Defender codes sustain a weak normative
conception of ethics deficient in the valuation of dignity, community, and equal
citizenship. This deficiency encourages the traditional routine of identitydisfigurement in defending cases of racial violence. Allegiance to that advocacy
routine emphasizes the primacy of a private, contractarian client-lawyer relationship and the priority of lawyer technique and tactical gambit.
Code emphasis on the private, contractarian nature of the client-lawyer
relationship is not fatal to a public, community-oriented ethic of race-conscious
responsibility. Adverting to a contractual relation in fact exposes certain background regulatory norms, such as reciprocity, that apply with equal vigor to a
public ethic. Derivative of the norms of rational bargaining, reciprocity sanctions racialized defenses as the efficient, transactional product of client-lawyer
consensus. The claim of efficiency plainly discounts the external costs of
character and community harm. More troubling, the contention of moral or
instrumental consensus falls overbroad. Too often in the turmoil of criminal
defense representation, reciprocity proves counterfactual and consensus collapses into fallacy. Insistence on neutral tactic and color-blind technique in the
racialized routine of the criminal justice system seems likewise false.
The falsity of client-lawyer reciprocity and consensus under the traditional ethic of defender representation in no way diminishes the value of
moral dialogue in advocacy. Instead, it underlines the normative importance
of dialogue commensurate with the preservation of individual dignity and
community integrity. The task of value preservation converts defenders into
moral custodians. Their custodial responsibility entails race-conscious dialogue with clients and communities in jointly opposing racial violence.
Equivalent to an ethic of care applauded in emerging alternative ethics
regimes, 129 race-conscious dialogue brings other-directed empathy and solidarity to criminal advocacy.
The facile rhetoric of empathy and solidarity and the disavowal of entrenched
tradition spur multiple objections to the ethic of race-conscious community
responsibility. A starting objection condemns the blithe imposition of constraints on a criminal defendant's freedom of defense. Protesting anticipated
encroachments on a defendant's strategic prerogative overlooks the codeendorsed limitations on a client's liberty to decide the means of his own
defense. Under the ethics codes, defensive strategy effectively rests on the
discretionary judgments of counsel, not the client.
Critics also claim that race-conscious constraints encumber a criminal defen-

128. See Bruce Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETmics 19, 38-55 (1997); Symposium, The Lawyer's Duty to Promote the Common Good, 40 S.
Thx. L. REv. 1 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith
Conference, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1075 (1998).
129. See generally Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethicfor Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665
(1993); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring:Building an Ethic of Care into ProfessionalResponsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992).
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dant's right to trial. Without more, disquiet over hindering a defendant's right to
trial seems exaggerated. Nothing in the proposed ethic of race-conscious community responsibility curbs a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right. The
ethic merely limits the racialized tactics available at trial, a limitation already
erected from equal protection
principles in the areas of jury selection and
130
peremptory challenge.
Further objections bemoan the implementation of a race-conscious ethic for
fear of lawyer bad faith in counseling and negotiating cases of racial violence.
Proponents of this objection fear that the new-found ethical disdain for the
traditional conduct of race trials heightens the danger of plea-bargaining agreements and accelerated dispositions inimical to the interests of defendants.
Absent evidence of past abuse or misconduct, conjecture about the danger of
lawyer bad faith in race-case counseling and negotiation seems premature. To
the extent that race-case counseling introduces additional variables for deliberation, it is fair to speculate that the risk of error increases proportionately. By
definition, legal decisionmaking in advocacy, adjudication, and legislation carries the risk of error. Mitigating the chance and effect of such error in raceconscious counseling for defendants facing mandatory sentencing or capital
punishment urges a review of counseling protocols in race cases.
Additional objections go to the principle of collectivity guiding client-lawyer
character and community deliberation. Practitioners warn that this principle erodes
client-centered rights and loyalties, skewing the individualist logic of the adversarial
system. But practitioners cling to a truncated version of such rights and loyalties. The
partisan duty they profess relegates other-directed third-party rights and community
obligations to secondary consideration even when collective fidelity serves to enrich
the adversarial system by purging it of bias and prejudice.
The racial cleansing of adversarial rights and duties may strike some practitioners as enfeebling. Deprived of righteous zealotry, defenders may feel enervated. Coupled with role confusion, this sense of weakness and ineffectuality
may recreate the ethical ambivalence and moral anxiety experienced under the
traditional defender practice of color-coded advocacy. Salvaging that defender
tradition may come from the claimed right to racial injustice. This sullied claim
of zealous advocacy views injustice as sometimes vital to client liberty. On this
accounting, fostering or simply exploiting racial injustice may enhance personal
autonomy to the detriment of social equality. The claimed right to long-run
racial justice augments this logic. It maintains that short-run incidents of racial
injustice prevent greater aggregate injustice. Even if empirically verifiable, the
system-wide costs of overweening partisanship of this sort seem pernicious,
depleting the morality of the defender role and public respect for law. The
lynching defenses of jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished
capacity provide a case in point. Championed as zealous advocacy, the defenses
privilege sociolegal norms of white supremacy. That act of racial privileging
130. See sources cited supra note 10.
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dissipates norms of racial community and equal citizenship. State-focused
claims of oppression and corruption raised to excuse such aggressive racialized
defenses furnish no rescue when they fail to vindicate intrinsic client rights or
extrinsic emancipatory policies.
VI.

NEW PRACTICES, OLD QUARRELS

The proposed race-conscious ethic of community prosecution and defense
introduces new practices of representation into the criminal justice system. In
doing so, it inflames old quarrels over the duty of effective individual and state
representation. Conventional views of criminal advocacy sever the duty of
effective representation from the identity and community interests of defendants, victims, and their families. Revisionist views seek to repair that break.
The clash of conventional and revisionist views of representation sharpens into
quarrels over the ethics of criminal advocacy in race cases.
A. IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND LAWYERS

Contemporary notions of identity are intimately tied to the expression of the
self and self-realization. ' 3' Personal expression comes in physical and rhetorical
performance. 132 Although possessing only ephemeral coherence, identity often
becomes fixed in commonplace visions of law, legal agency, and sociolegal
relationships.1 33 Liberalism links agency and autonomy through the capacity
to value 134 in moral and legal decisionmaking. 1 3 5 Perceptions of the capacity
for agent (defendant or victim) self-direction in law, politics, and legal representation are complicated by difference.' 36 The image of difference imprints

131. See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-17 (2000); Ben Morgan, Developing the Modem Concept of the Self: The Trial of
Meister Eckhart, 116 TELOs 56, 56-61 (1999); Debra Morris, Privacy, Privation, Perversity: Toward
New Representations of the Personal,25 SIGNS 323, 326-46 (2000); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and
the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443,462-76 (1998).
132. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 2-40, 127-63 (1997);
Ilene Durst, Valuing Women Storytellers: What They Talk About When They Talk About Law, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINlSM 245, 264-67 (1999); see also Judith Butler, "AppearancesAside," 88 CAL. L. REv. 55,
59-63 (2000) (mentioning the "non-phenomenal aspects of personhood" subject to categorization,
stereotype, and discrimination).
133. See Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 401,
417-24 (2000).
134. See Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the
Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 110-38 (1999).
135. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 822-40 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and "Constitutional
Patriotism," 76 DENv. U. L. REV. 1009, 1012-14 (1999).
136. See Judy Scales-Trent, Oppression, Lies, and the Dream of Autonomy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
857, 863-64 (1999); Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 LAW &
SoC. INQUIRY 443, 446-67 (1999); Melissa A. Orlie, Beyond Identity and Difference, 27 POL. THEORY
140, 144-48 (1999) (book review).
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stigma 37 and encourages fabrication. 138 Difference imagery limits lawyers' and
judges' ability to discern the full dimensions of identity. 139 Hobbled by cognitive and epistemological impairments, lawyers sometimes mistake norms for
facts. 140 This cognitive error and its inferential stream of blame and responsibility impose interpretive constraints on the practice of law by prosecutors and
defenders. 14 1 Prejudicial reliance on racial appearances and stereotypes brands
the prosecutions and defenses of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, Lemrick
Nelson and Charles Price, the Central Park Jogger juveniles, and the Texas
Klansmen. Engrafting normative representational commitments on the surface
of ungrounded or invented racial facts erases identity history and memory.' 4 2
Modem and postmodern conventions of reasoned advocacy founder in assembling identity histories and in retrieving collective memories of race. 14 3 To be
effective, identity-based community-advocacy practices must reassemble the
history and revive the memory of race-conscious collective action and unity.
Community implies belonging and membership. 1 44
' Belonging entails shared
social norms, narratives, and spaces. 14 5 Because difference inhibits openness

137. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 418-45
(2000); Kenneth W. Mack, Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South: Travel and
Segregation on Tennessee Railroads, 1875-1905, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 377, 387-401 (1999); Peter
Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in InterracialMarriage: Interstate Comity,
Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, 1860s1960s, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557, 567-74 (1999).
138. Cf Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: "Passing" Revised and Demystification as a
CriticalPractice, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 297, 348 (2000) (arguing that the traditionally conceptualized "assumptions and ideological investments that underlie 'passing'... support white supremacy").
139. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Why Culture Matters to Law: The Difference Politics Makes, in
CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW 85, 85-110 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns

eds., 1999); Kendall Thomas, "Ain't Nothing Like the Real Thing ": Black, Masculinity, Gay Sexuality,
and the JargonofAuthenticity, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT, supra note 16, at 116-35.

140. See Rosemary J. Coombe & Jonathan Cohen, The Law and Late Modem Culture: Reflections
on Between Facts and Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 76 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1029, 1031-41 (1999); David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and
the Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1311-33 (1999); Nicole Huberfeld, Three
Generations of Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A DisturbingReturn to Eugenics in the Recent "Workfare" Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 98, 121-31 (1998).
141. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41,47 (2000).
142. See Shoshana Felman, Forms of Judicial Blindness: Traumatic Narratives and Legal Repetitions, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 25, 28-93 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999);

Brook Thomas, Stigmas, Badges, and Brands: Discriminating Marks in Legal History, in HISTORY,
MEMORY, AND THE LAW, supra, at 249, 250-81; Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2036-42 (2000) (book review).
143. See PIERRE SCHLAO, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 126-40 (1998); Francis J. Mootz III,

PsychotherapeuticPractice as a Model for Postmodern Legal Theory, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 299,
380-92 (2000).
144. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rub6n Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GA. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2-5, 21-24 (1998).
145. See Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of
Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 191-99 (2000); Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada:
Translating Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 469-75; Robert J.
Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Batztusch, Norms and Neighborhoods: Community Structure and Racial
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and sharing, lawyers, clients, victims, and community members must be responsive to the identity imperatives of racial expression, minority group selfdetermination, and interracial reconciliation. 146 Responsive community requires
a profound sense of collaboration and mutual responsibility to forge group
connection and to overcome separation. 147 Both assimilation and contractualism

offer a thin sense of mutuality. 148 A richer sense comes from democratic
citizenship.' 49 Democratic models of citizenship rest on inclusive deliberative
dialogue with others.' 50 Deliberation establishes the foundation for consent and
grants legitimacy to authority,1 5' even in the face of disagreement. 152 Moreover,
and community a public role in the civic
it affords a defendant, victim,
53
1
relations.
race
governance of
Community advocacy gives lawyers a similarly public role in the civic
regulation of race cases. Discarding convention, the role rejects practices that
harm and allow harm in reinforcing caste and in constructing political and
socioeconomic inequality.' 54 Plainly, simple rejection neither eradicates racial
harm nor ends the suppression of equal civic participation.155 Reform entails

Differences in Tolerance of Deviance and Legal Cynicism, RESEARCHING
Fall 1999, at 2, 4-5.

THE LAW:

AN ABF

UPDATE,

146. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures,Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in American
Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REV. 229, 236-39 (1999); Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposalfor Community-Based
Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 195,
210-21 (2000); Christopher Heath Wellman, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Group Rights, 18
LAW & PHIL. 13, 27-34 (1999) (demonstrating the necessity of balancing individual autonomy with
moral responsibility to others).
147. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 134-48
(1994); MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 105-64 (1992); John
Martin Fischer, Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, 110 ETHICS 93, 93-98 (1999).
148. See Rahul Kumar, Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common Sense, 28
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 275, 277-96 (1999); Ayelet Shachar, On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability,
28 POL. THEORY 64, 65-70 (2000); Susan M. Sterett, On Citizenship, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 777, 783-84
(1999); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500-09 (1998).
149. See Eric Blumenson, Who Counts Morally?, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 7-38 (1999-2000); William
E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 85-90 (1999).
150. See Robert E. Goodin, Democratic Deliberation Within, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 81, 98-106
(2000); Iris Marion Young, Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITIcs
151, 152-58 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
27 POL. THEORY 857, 870-71
151. See Emily Hauptmann, Deliberation=Legitimacy=Democracy,
(1999); A. John Simmons, Justificationand Legitimacy, 109 ETHICS 739, 740-43 (1999).
152. See AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 11-51 (1996); Thomas
Christiano, Justice and Disagreementat the Foundationsof PoliticalAuthority, 110 ETHICS 165, 174-83
(1999).
153. Cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000)
(challenging conventions of purely private and public administrative function and participation).
154. See Susan Bickford, Constructing Inequality: City Spaces and the Architecture of Citizenship,
28 POL. THEORY 355, 362-71 (2000); David McCarthy, Harming and Allowing Harm, 110 ETHICS 749,
755-60 (2000).
155. On forms of citizen participation, see Adam P. Hellegers, Reforming HUD's "One-Strike"
Public Housing Evictions Through Tenant Participation,90 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 323, 355-59
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instilling community-regarding professional values into the justice-seeking ethical mandates' 56 that imbue the heroic tradition of lawyers and legal-rights
advocacy.157 This tradition animates the civil rights movement 15 8 and successor
movements in poverty law' 59 and political lawyering. 160 Doubtless, communitybased lawyering 16 1 produces role confusion and identity strain for advocates
163
working within that tradition, 162 quite apart from the encumbrances of gender

(1999); Linda Mulcahy, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? A Critique of the Ability of Community
Mediation to Suppress and FacilitateParticipationof Civil Life, 27 J.L. & Soc'Y 133, 135-48 (2000).
156. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 3-6 (1999); Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice
Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1475-78 (1998); Terence C. Halliday, Politicsand Civic Professionalism: Legal Elites and Cause Lawyers, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1013, 1036-59 (1999).
157. See CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN

26-70 (1998); JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL
RIGHTS 3-47 (1978); Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the Dust and
To Kill a Mockingbird, 49 DUKE L.J. 601, 732-40 (1999); Kenneth Baynes, Rights as Critique and the
Critique of Rights: Karl Marx, Wendy Brown, and the Social Function of Rights, 28 POL. THEORY 451,
464-66 (2000); Allen Rostron, Inside the ACLU: Activism and Anti-Communism in the Late 1960s, 33
NEW ENG. L. REV. 425, 429-41 (1999); Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern
FederalDistrict Courts and the Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L.
REV. 471, 472-82 (1999); Stuart A. Scheingold, Taking Weber Seriously: Lawyers, Politics, and the
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Liberal State, 24 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 1061, 1071-78 (1999) (reviewing LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF
WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH

CENTURIES (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997)).
158. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 267-84, 430-39 (1994); Francesca Polletta, The
Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966, 34 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 367, 383-401 (2000).
159. See BRYANT GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL AID AND IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17-51 (1980); Peter Edelman, Responding to

the Wake-up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.YU. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 547, 556-58
(1998).
160. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner'sReflections on PoliticalLawyering, 31 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 302-04 (1996); Martha Minow, PoliticalLawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 287, 288-93 (1996).
161. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 557, 571-90 (1999); Zenobia Lai et al., The Lessons of the Parcel C
Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 23-34 (2000); Daniel S. Shah,
Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217,
249-58 (1999); David D. Troutt, Ghettos Made Easy: The Metamarket/AntimarketDichotomy and the
Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 427, 502-06
(2000).
162. See Gerald P. Lopez, An Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 315, 317-23 (1996); Nancy D. Polikoff, Am IMy Client?: The Role Confusion
ofa Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 443,448-70 (1996).
163. See Bryna Bogoch, Courtroom Discourse and the Gendered Construction of Professional
Identity, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 329, 331-34 (1999); Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Constructionof the
Lawyer's Persona, 22 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 239, 266-73 (1999) (reviewing KATHRYN K. SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION'S WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900

(1995)); Kathleen Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Gender Inequality in Law: Problems of Structure and
Agency in Recent Studies of Gender in Anglo-American Legal Professions,23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 681,
683-702 (1998) (reviewing JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A STUDY OF LAWYER'S LIVES
(1995), MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996), and
JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRAILS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS (1995)).
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and race.'64 Such strain may explain the critique of race-conscious community
advocacy emerging out of the clinical and critical race movements. The critique,
powerfully advanced by Richard Delgado 165 and Abbe Smith, 16 6 tenders both a
sympathetic extension and a scathing indictment of the proposed ethic.
In her critique, Smith acknowledges that racism exists as a "deeply entrenched" facet of the American legal system, especially the criminal justice
racism as "a powerful and pervasive force" that
system. 167 She describes
"colors everything."' 16 8 The very "omnipresence of race," Smith suggests, may
attach "racial significance" to "every defense theory, every defense strategy,
every defense." 169 She declares: "Every defense story that involves race may
well be a 'racialized narrative.' ,170
By admitting the omnipresent predicate of race, Smith strikes at a core
question of the instant project. Indeed, she demands: "What is a sensitive,
concerned, 'race-conscious' defense lawyer to do?"'17 ' Given the normative
stakes, the question deserves more than her mordant rejoinder: "Plead them all
guilty? '1 72 For professing guilt, as Smith well understands, accomplishes nothing in the fight against racial infirmity. In stark contrast, Delgado recognizes
"the need to attend to the rhetorical meaning of race in trying cases and
representing clients."1 73 For Delgado, grasping that meaning in the context of
racialized narrative enlarges appreciation of the myriad "ways race determines
outcomes" in civil and criminal justice systems. 74 Additionally, it works to
enhance efforts to "combat racialized narratives colored by racism."'75 Furtherlawyers to map "the limits of what can be achieved through
more, it enables
76
advocacy."1
Surprisingly, Smith ignores these constructive lines of inquiry. Instead, she
charges that the instant project "is wrong-headed and regressive as a matter of
both practice and theory."' 1 7 7 More troubling, she accuses me of "joining forces
with those who care least about the least among us: the poor, the black, the
accused, and the imprisoned."'' 78 That accusation reflects the corruption of

164. See David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1924, 1943-69 (1999)
(reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK. A TRUE STORY OF RACE AND AMERICA (1999)).

165. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 1571.
166. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1585.
167. Id. at 1601 (observing that "race and criminal justice are so intertwined in this country-in
practice and perception-that it is impossible to talk about one without the other").
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1571.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Smith, supra note 3, at 1591.
178. Id.
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liberal theory under the dominant tradition of criminal defense practice, a
tradition that privileges zeal over dialogue, freedom over equality, action over
ideas, and ultimately lawyer egoism over lawyer-client collaboration.
B. ZEAL OVER DIALOGUE: THE CRITIQUE OF LAWYER DUTY

No one will quarrel with Smith's observation that "there is something exceptionally burdensome about lawyering on behalf of the accused."'' 79 Nor will
anyone differ with the view, even if calculated to deflect criticism, that those
who comment on criminal defense ethics and lawyering "should know something of this unique burden" through either "actual experience" or "studied
effort" in the thickness of this context. 80 One must quarrel, however, with the
view that criminal defense lawyers hold no responsibility "for the persistence of
racism and racial stereotypes in the criminal justice system and larger American
society.""" Like other legal agents enveloped in the criminal justice system,
defense lawyers share in that responsibility. 82 Although their position commands fewer state resources, it acquires greater accountability from the constitutional commitment to dignity and equality.
Anticipating this claim of higher accountability, Smith contends that defense
lawyers, unlike judges, lack "the power to determine guilt or innocence."' 18 3 But
this contention proves too much. The lack of power to determine guilt or
innocence is hardly tantamount to powerlessness. Defense lawyers are far from
ineffectual. They hold and exercise the power to shape guilt and innocence
every day in the arena of plea-bargaining, pretrial investigation, and trial
strategy.
Smith cites a similar lack of power to "contribute to the institutional and
social status of racial minorities" in the United States, ceding such power to
prosecutors, juries, and judges. 18 4 But discourse molds institutional and social
status, whether hidden in low-profile trials or exposed in the public transcripts
of high-profile trials. Discounting such influence, Smith complains that "the
only time defense attorneys are depicted as powerful is when we are being taken
to task for adhering to the central ethical mandate for criminal lawyers: the
requirement of zealous advocacy." 8 5 Disclaimer by complaint or excuse runs
afoul of the sociolegal reality of defender discursive power in both pretrial and

179. Id. at 1586.
180. Id. at 1586-87.
181. Id. at 1587.
182. See id. Smith pleads evasively: "Of all the political and institutional actors upon whom Alfieri
might focus, why us?" Id.
183. Id. at 1588-89.
184. Id.at 1589.
185. Id.The lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy arises from the CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15
(1908) (commanding the lawyer's "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of utmost learning and ability"), the MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2000) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to
the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."), and the MODEL CODE OF
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trial proceedings. It also conceals the more insidious power defenders wield in
the relational discourses of counseling and negotiation. Worse still, the denial
confuses an adversarial mandate for an ethical mandate.
The mandate of the ethical defender is multifaceted, splintered by competing
commitments to the law, client, community, and courts. These tensions are part
of the cacophony of liberal legal theory. Yet, Smith equates observance of these
competing values with a conservative agenda. 186 This equation suffers from
normative and empirical error. Smith commits error by conceding the neglect of
"the broader community" in advocacy while dismissing a race-conscious, community-centered "burden" as "so untenable as to be laughable., 187 But she fails
to trace the genesis of community neglect, gauge the weight of its burden,
explain its incompatibility with past and present burdens, or clarify its untenable
quality. Instead, she warns of sapping the "unmitigated devotion" of criminal
defenders to the criminally accused.' 8 8 For Smith, this dilution "completely"
transforms defenders into "protectors of the community."' 89 However, she
provides no evidence of unmitigated defender devotion. Measured against the
well-documented literature of defender deficiencies in plea-bargaining, at trial,
and on appeal, such sentimental claims of devotion seem counterintuitive, if not
outright false. Yet even when devotion finds credence in intuition and experience, it in no way precludes other-regarding community commitments.
C.

FREEDOM OVER EQUALrY: THE CRITIQUE OF COMMUNITY

Staunch in her defense of freedom for the accused, Smith points to "an
emerging neo-conservatism in legal ethics focusing on criminal defense lawyering."'1 90 She construes the injunction of race-conscious community advocacy as
a neo-conservative "call for communitarianism and racial justice over individual
rights or individual justice. ' ' Despite its equality-inspired thrust, she discards
such advocacy as a "brand of conservatism" motivated by an "abiding hostility
toward the adversarial system."' 92 This hasty denunciation permits the grave
inequality of the adversarial system to go uncensured. The lack of any mention,
much less condemnation, of this grievous inequity is inexplicable.
Smith contends that the "heralding of communitarianism over individual
rights and liberties" typifies an "emerging ethical conservatism."' 193 Evidently,
proponents of this ethical stance cloak their regressive allegiances in the
"politics" of racial identity and authenticity derived from a critical race or
PROF'L REsPONSIILrY Canon 7 (1969) ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the
Bounds of the Law.").
186. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1589.
187. Id. at 1590.
188. Id. at 1591.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1592 (footnotes omitted).
192. Id. at 1591-92.
193. Id. at 1593.
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feminist perspective.1 94 Undaunted, Smith purports to strip away this cloak to

discover "the traditional concern for community in criminal justice."'' 9 5 The
significance of this discovery in recentering community-based criminal advocacy norms seems wholly unappreciated. Once again, her disdain for nonadversarial tradition goes unexplained.
Pressed to escape the import of community tradition in criminal advocacy,
Smith levels a more powerful objection in the claim of incoherence. Invoking
the epistemological demurrer favored by criminal defenders, she assails the
definitional opacity of community. 1 96 In addition to its flimsy definition, she
protests that "the notion of community invariably implies exclusion from that
community."' 97 Further, she complains that the championing "of community
interests over individual rights and liberties" replicates "an old, tiresome debate
among progressive lawyers working for social change."' 98 She derides the
debate over the relative merits of individual and group representation as "ridiculous and counterproductive."' 99
In place of community or group representational norms, Smith heralds the
norm of individual-client autonomy. However, she makes no reference to the
source of that autonomy, its nature, or its relation to lawyer discretion. Rather
than engage in reasoned exposition, Smith blithely trumpets the proposition that
a "client can certainly choose to forsake his or her interests for the sake of a
larger group or issue, but lawyers should not forsake individual clients for any
'larger' cause." 2°° But she furnishes no insight into the mechanics of client
choice or the constraining dynamics of the client-lawyer relationship. Undeterred by explanation, she announces: "Lawyers should not set limits on what
they will do to achieve a client's interests because they conflict with the
lawyer's values. ' 20 The announcement omits careful parsing of the nature of
such limits, their internal and external origins, their impact on client interests,
and the interplay of client and lawyer values.
From the principle of client-interest priority and the elevated norm of client
autonomy, Smith deduces that "it may be perfectly appropriate for a criminal
defendant to decide to forego certain legal strategies because they may hurt his
or her community., 20 2 The logic of this corollary turns on the separation of

194. Id.
195. Id. (footnotes omitted).
196. See id. at 1593-94 ("[I]t is unclear what Alfieri means by community. What community is he
talking about? Who does this community include? Are there membership criteria? If so, who determines the criteria and who selects those to whom community membership is extended? What becomes
of those to whom membership is refused?" (footnote omitted)).
197. Id. at 1594. Smith continues: "For there to be a community, there must be outsiders from that
community." Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1594-95.
200. Id. at 1595.
201. Id. at 1595-96.
202. Id. at 1596.

2272

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:2227

client morality and lawyer ethics. That dichotomy allows Smith to conceive of
client decisionmaking as "a matter of individual client conscience, not legal
ethics. 2 °3 Curiously, she confines the ambit of this decisionmaking only to
high-profile cases in which "intense media attention, [which] influence[s] public
opinion and discourse," may sway client conscience. 2°0 This unalloyed speculation restricts the capacity of client conscience-driven decisionmaking and misapprehends the pressures of low-profile cases.
D. ACTION OVER IDEAS: THE CRITIQUE OF ABSTRACTION

Like any dedicated criminal defender, Smith is wedded to action. Her rebuke
of the call for community representation, whether rooted in "a generalized
notion of 'civic virtue' or a concern about racial subordination," stems from
concern that such advocacy will "tie the hands of criminal defense lawyers.'2 °5
Fearful of imposing an unnecessary limit on criminal defense advocacy, she
overstates the claim of institutional practicality. She begins her defense of the
practical by citing "a lack of concreteness" in the depiction of racial harm and
an absence of "specific, empirically-grounded claims. 20 6 The scarcity of empirical proof, according to Smith, leaves such harm "essentially imaginary," though
not so imaginary as to render it "utterly without basis. 20 7 At least in "highly
publicized cases," she admits that criminal representation "may well have an
impact on popular perceptions and culture., 20 8 Even to Smith, "some cases have
meaning9 beyond the courthouse walls and influence how we think about
race."

20

The admission that "[s]ome narratives and images may well be painful to
some people and some 'communities' " undercuts Smith's pragmatic justification of the defender function.2 10 Once she concedes that "a particular defense
theory is offensive and will reinforce some peoples' prejudices," the fact that
"the actual harm is elusive" becomes inconsequential. 2 1' However elusive, the
harm is damaging to identity and community when it afflicts defendants, their
families, and their neighbors. That affliction may be privately cloaked or
publicly hidden. Smith's crucial acknowledgement deprives her of easy escape
from the harmful grip of her own practices.
Undone by her own hand, Smith flees to soothing conjecture. Grandly, she
opines: "[Mjaybe the offensiveness of the theory will lead to outcry and debate
203. Id.
204. Id. Smith further insists that "far from the lights and cameras that high-profile cases attract, the
reality is the public knows little and cares less about what happens in most criminal cases." Id. at
1596 n.58.
205. Id. at 1596-97 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 1597.
207. Id. at 1598.
208. Id.
209. Id. (footnote omitted).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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that will uncover, and ultimately overcome, prejudice. ' '2 12 Outcry from whom?
Debate among whom? No hue and cry will emanate from the precincts of
criminal defense lawyers, especially those inured to the color line. Even if
heard, the feeble call to overcome prejudice sounds too late and altogether
hollow. Floundering, Smith reaches for a last magical solution: free speech.
Ever the trusting civil libertarian, she asks: "Why isn't more speech the answer
here ... ?,,213 Surely, more racist speech is no answer. Yet, for Smith, speech is
the only answer. Unwilling to ban or even regulate racist speech, Smith finds no
factual or substantive ground for the defense of antiracist speech. Without
evidence of the "real" and "tangible" racial harm for which she clamors,
nothing in her argument bolsters a petition for antiracist speech.2 14 Delgado, by
comparison, posits the fact of group harm and injury.2 1 5 He warns that "monocular vision can end up harming a group., 2 1 6 Remarking on the veiled quality of
racist treatment and racialized narratives and on the natural or necessary quality
of group racialization, he urges investigation of "the way race operates to
constrain choices and limit trial possibilities. 21 7
E. EGOISM OVER COLLABORATION: THE CRITIQUE OF PASSION

Unsure of speech and wary of harm, Smith descends into preoccupation with
zeal. For Smith, authenticity and ardor combine in the earnest vitality of action.
In her view, the fervent defender is the good defender, however myopic or
unprincipled. Passion, she explains, "unbridled, undistilled, and intensely focused" is the moral force "that drives criminal defense lawyers., 21 8 Criticism of
this vainglorious moral impetus purportedly betrays "a thinly-veiled aversion to
passion. '' 2 9 According to Smith, restraint in the form of "a more muted voice
on behalf of a client" or "a more measured approach that contemplates others"
220
discloses if not cowardice then a kind of pusillanimity.
Smith elucidates the pathology of abstraction that dupes critics of her defenderwarrior model. It is not simply frailty or an aversion to the rough and tumble of
adversarial combat, she sympathetically explains, but "a preference for ideas
over feelings, for the imagined over the real, and for diffuse, collective relations
over intense, individual ones" that fills dissenters with "a longing for bloodlessness." 22 This startling and deluded egoism is best exemplified by Smith's
misreading of Barbara Babcock's much cited account of her own benchmark
212. Id. at 1598-99.
213. Id. at 1599.
214. Id.
215. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 1582-83.
216. Id. at 1582 (cautioning that "excessive preoccupation with the way people of color are spoken
of and constructed... can end up harming minority groups").
217. Id. at 1584.
218. Smith, supra note 3, at 1600.
219. Id.at 1599.
220. Id.at 1600.
221. Id. (footnote omitted).
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criminal trial and the jury verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" that
instructively closed it. 222 According to Babcock's reportage, her client, upon
hearing the verdict, burst into tears, threw her arms around Babcock, and
declared: "'I'm so happy for you.' ,223 The stunning irony of this client
exclamation is nearly lost upon Smith. Grudgingly, she acknowledges that the
passion of criminal-defense advocacy "sometimes takes on a life of its own. ' 2 24
That acknowledgement overlooks the bare egoism and solipsism of misplaced
passion. More glaring, it fails to account for the incompetence and sloth that
passion sometimes masks. Smith supplies no empirical linkage between passion
and competence or diligence. She merely presumes that passion guarantees
effective assistance.
Delgado declines to address the vaunted passion of criminal defense lawyers.
More interested in broadening the inquiry undertaken here, he urges the inclusion of civil trials in studies of the rhetoric of race. Exploring the role of race for
civil litigants and lawyers, he asserts, inevitably confronts "a host of racialized
narratives, substantive laws, remedies, presumptions, and discourse patterns., 22 5 To Delgado, that confrontation must occur outside of the black-white
paradigm of race. Investigation of the role of racialized narratives, he stresses,
226
needs to encompass "groups beyond blacks" such as Latinos and Asians.
American society, he points out, "has racialized Latinos and Asians differently
from African Americans. ' 22 7 The wide span of discrimination, afflicting skin
color, accent, national origin, immigrant status, religion, and culture, furnishes
an additional reason to expand the current Afrocentric focus: "Preoccupation
can easily end up slighting, or even
with a single racial minority 22group
8
another.,
harming,
affirmatively
Delgado notes the importance of legal education in the study of racial
advocacy, particularly clinical legal education, remarking that racialized narratives or treatment "might be unrecognizable to a lawyer not trained to look for
them. '229 Lawyer training, he adds, should be carefully tailored to contemplate
both racial and ethnic-group diversity. 230 Citing the multiplicity of race and "the
different experiences, methods of racial identification, and histories of each
minority group," Delgado contends that "it is not possible to properly understand racial minorities by merely analogizing from what one has learned about

222. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 204 (1983).
223. Id. at 179.
224. Smith, supra note 3, at 1600 n.80.
225. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1575.
226. Id. at 1576.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1575, 1576 ("Ignoring racialization of one group can also positively injure another.").
229. Id. at 1577, 1578 (contending that "lawyers must understand how different groups are at risk of
discriminatory treatment by society and the courts").
230. Id. at 1578 ("Sensitization to the narrative of race regarding one group thus does little when one
is representing another group.").
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others." 23 '

To his credit, Delgado also urges the study of white narratives and racialized
rhetoric. He argues that the analysis of white racialized narratives and their
embedded notions of privilege and superiority illuminates the meaning of color
blindness and merit in law and lawyering. Searching for evidence of white
race-coding in the areas of hate speech and affirmative action, he claims that "a
free-speech narrative is often deployed in a way that advances and encodes
white privilege, while cutting short discussion of countervailing equality values." 2 32 Likewise, in the case of affirmative action, he maintains that "whiteness
plays an unexpressed but powerful role" in ascertaining remedies for historic
racial wrongs.23 3

Alert to both interpretive and material subordination, Delgado encourages
advocates to be circumspect. Afraid of the concrete violence of the criminal
justice system, Smith exhorts advocates to march ahead. Her admonition is:
Don't look back! For Delgado and others dedicated to the integration of theory
and practice, this admonition would seem less facile if it came accompanied by
some insight into the danger of shuttering advocacy to the reality of racial
identity and community. Without attention to race, prosecutors and defenders
construct their own prison house of advocacy.
To be sure, criminal trials are not the wellspring of racism in law and society,
and prosecutors and defenders are not its petitioners. In the same way that
criminal trials cannot be fairly blamed for the race-ing of law, prosecutors and
defenders cannot be solely blamed for the perpetuation of racism and racial
stereotypes. But they can be held accountable. Equally important, they can rise
to meet a higher standard of accountability, even if that standard imposes upon
criminal defendants and their victims an unwieldy and unjust burden of considering the identity-inscribed dignity of the other and the aspiration of community.
That other-regarding burden is the first and last obligation of citizenship. It
attaches to all members of the American community, inequality notwithstanding. And it is not lightly borne.
CONCLUSION: RACE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Constructive engagement in legal advocacy and ethics demands a liberal faith
in reason and reform. Part of that faith entails a tolerance for experimentation
and imperfection in the hard march toward attaining racial equality and community. For many criminal defenders and lay activists, the march of civil rights and
civic reconstruction long ago abandoned the liberal ideals of individual dignity
and collective good. What is left of that derelict march is a kind of rear-guard
action aimed at stanching the retreat from basic procedural and substantive

231. Id. at 1579 ("Any particular racial narrative might be authentic as applied to one racial
minority, but not so when applied to another.").
232. Id. at 1580.
233. Id. at 1581.
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safeguards and at adjusting the recurrent imbalance of the adversarial system.
For prosecutors, the march serves a disciplinary rather than an emancipatory
function. Its civic purpose is punitive not reconstructive. That purpose overrides
rehabilitative and therapeutic objectives in the urgency to enforce law and legal
sanction.
Albeit practical, neither the prosecutor's nor the defender's sense of purposive professional commitment exhibits the other-regarding faith or risk-taking
tolerance found in the dialogic and communitarian strands of liberal legalism.
Oddly, the postmodern sensibility-so impatient with the practical and so
indulgent of abstraction--displays a receptivity to the higher aspiration of
dialogue and community, even as it belittles the liberal faith. The postmodern
sensibility also shows an adroitness in mapping the twisting flow of discursive
practices, institutional procedures, and social relations within law and lawyering. Critical Race Theory demonstrates a similar acuity and vigor of analysis,
particularly in parsing the color-coded meaning of constitutional, statutory, and
doctrinal materials. But both postmodernist and critical race sensibilities stall in
pursuing and resolving the tensions bearing on the liberal-postmodem and
theory-practice divides. Partially spawned by identity and community conflicts,
those tensions challenge legal theorists and practitioners to revisit conventional
standards of discursive and symbolic speech, narrative interpretation, and social
construction to better understand and aid subordinated clients, victims, and
communities in the criminal justice system. Because the standards prevail at
multiple sites--courtrooms, law offices, and police precincts-the struggle to
reform prosecution and defender practices ranges widely across public and
private fields of advocacy. This confluence of sites and convergence of publicprivate spheres hinders the navigation of this project through liberal and critical
theory.
In time, my hope is that this project will persuade race prosecutors and
defenders to reconsider their ethical responsibilities in racially and politically
charged cases like the recent state murder trial of four New York Police
Department (NYPD) officers for the shooting death of Amadou Diallo 234 and
the federal investigation of that killing, 35 and the current federal and state
investigation of police brutality in the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD)
Rampart Division.23 6 Both the NYPD and LAPD officers under scrutiny participated in neighborhood-based, anticrime units within impoverished communities
of color-communities that were represented by public defenders as well as
private criminal defense lawyers. Furthermore, both investigations have involved U.S. Justice Department lawyers, local U.S. attorneys, and state prosecu234. See Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2000, at Al.
235. See Susan Sachs, U.S. Decides Not to Prosecute4 Officers Who Killed Diallo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2001, at B1.
236. See Jane Fritsch, Squads That Tripped Up Walking the Bad Walk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, § 4,
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tors. Whether this project can convince prosecutors and defenders in such
circumstances to adopt a race-conscious community ethic of representation
remains unanswered. Until an answer is found, the project will prod practitioners and scholars to reevaluate the place of racial identity, racialized narrative,
and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and ethics.237

237. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1676-86 (1997) (reviewing
supra note 6; and CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED A MOVEMENT, supra note 6).
CRMCAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE,

